Cornell Law Review
Volume 69
Issue 1 November 1983

Article 1

Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation
Richard L. Marcus

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol69/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

MYTH AND REALITY IN PROTECTIVE ORDER

LITIGATION*
RichardL. Marcust
Judges and commentators have roundly condemned the current
"boom" in federal civil litigation and the attendant "crisis" in discovery.I These developments threaten to undermine the central goal of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure articulated in rule 1---"to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."' 2 In 1979,
the Supreme Court observed that "the discovery provisions. . . are subject to the injunction of Rule 1."3 Further invoking rule 1 concerns, the
Court recently declared general deterrence a legitimate objective for discovery sanctions. 4 In the same vein, lower courts and litigants have
come to rely on protective orders that limit the disclosure of information
obtained through discovery to speed up the discovery process and minimize discovery disputes. Particularly in complex litigation, these orders
have become an accepted part of the civil litigation landscape.
Under rule 26(c), a court may, on the motion of any party or person being deposed, enter a protective order to "protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden of ex*
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Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1969, Pomona; J.D. 1972, University of California, Berkeley. I am indebted to my colleagues John Nowak and John
Muench, each of whom read an earlier draft of this article and provided helpful comments.
In addition, David L. Feltman, University of Illinois College of Law, Class of 1984, provided
valuable research assistance.
I The literature on the litigation boom and the discovery crisis is rapidly becoming
voluminous. See Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the PretrialDevelopment of Civil Actions:
Model Rulesfor Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 875; Kirkham, Problemsof Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497 (1979); Peckham, The FederalJudgeas a
Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Casefom Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. RE'. 770
(1981); Pollack, Discovegy-Its Abse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978); Rosenberg & King,
Curbing Discovery Abse in Civil Litigation. Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. RE'. 579;
Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The TrialJudge'sRole, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978). This
phenomenon is receiving increasing public attention. See, e.g., Burger Says Growing Caseloads
Peril Court System, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at B1, col. 1 (national ed.).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 1;see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). See generally 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029 (1969) (primary purpose of rules is to promote justice).
3 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
4 See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976); see
also Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientationin the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1033, 1033-35, 1044-45 (1978) (arguing that threat to rule 1 interests explains courts'
willingness to expand availability of sanctions).
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pense" upon a showing of "good cause."'5 The good cause standard
gives courts very broad discretion to tailor protective provisions to fit the
needs of the case. 6 Using this discretion, courts have regularly entered
protective orders not only to protect trade secrets, 7 but also to avoid
other undesirable consequences such as the invasion of the litigants' privacy.8 Thus, even though the protective order movant bears the burden
of justifying the motion, courts have retained sufficient flexibility under
the good cause standard to identify the circumstances that warrant judicially imposed restrictions on the use of discovered information. Because most protective orders are entered by stipulation rather than on
motion, 9 both courts and litigants are freed from the burden of litigating
such issues. Consequently, protective orders save countless hours ofjudicial time and substantial litigation costs. Thus are rule 1 interests served.
This commendable reality is threatened by a series of decisions
based on an amalgam of common law and first amendment principles
that require litigation of protective order issues and deprive protective
orders, particularly those entered by stipulations, of their reliability.
These decisions start with the premise that discovery is intrinsically public unless closed by court order, an assumption these courts use to justify
invoking the common law and first amendment rights of the public to
attend judicial proceedings. They reason further that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure contemplate that all information garnered through
discovery is presumptively available for any use not expressly forbidden
by the court. This assumption provides a foundation for their endorsement of the litigants' first amendment rights to disclose material garnered through discovery. These courts hold that application of these
principles in the aggregate requires strict limitations on the availability
of protective orders. Thus may rule 1 interests be frustrated. This article
argues for rejection of this disquieting trend on the grounds that it lacks
compelling support in law and is based on essentially mythical premises
about litigation.
In re Halkin, 10 a 1979 decision by a sharply divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, is
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
6 See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2036, at 267, 269 (1970) (emphasizing
that court has complete control over discovery process and may be as inventive as necessities
of particular case require).
7 Rule 26(c)(7) specifically authorizes entry of a protective order with respect to "a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information." FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
8 See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 982 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (sealing of documents filed by plaintiff in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment); Gallela
v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 987, 997 (2d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff excluded from deposition of defendant
to prevent him from taking pictures of defendant during deposition).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 37-42.
10 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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the leading case in this trend. Given its prominence, the case merits detailed examination at the outset to exemplify the emerging principles.
The Halkin plaintiffs sued a number of present and former CIA officials,
alleging that they had been the victims of illegal surveillance because
they opposed the Vietnam War. Pursuant to rule 34, they obtained production of some 3,000 pages of material that the defendants had already
purged of "sensitive" information prior to production. 1 Before delivering the documents to the plaintiffs, the defendants neither moved for a
protective order nor obtained the plaintiffs' agreement to hold the documents in confidence. t2 After inspecting the documents, the plaintiffs
gave written notice to the defendants that they intended to release three
documents to the press one week thereafter. This notice prompted the
defendants to move for a protective order on the ground that disclosure
would deprive them of a fair trial. The trial court entered a protective
order, even though the defendants had submitted no affidavits in sup13
port of their motion.
The trial court's ruling was questionable under accepted protective
order doctrine. The defendants had purged the documents before production and there was little indication that the expurgated remnants
contained material warranting a protective order. More significantly,
the defendants' failure to submit affidavits would normally have required denial of their motion. Writing for the majority, Judge
Bazelon 14 eschewed the easy course of relying on existing protective order principles to overturn the order.' 5 Instead, he analogized protective
orders to prior restraints and articulated a broad constitutional limitation on the issuance of protective orders.' 6 He emphasized the public
interest in the administration ofjustice and the theory that the discovery
process, as part of the judicial process, is public.' 7 Concluding that the
discovery rules "place no limitations on what a party may do with
''

Id at 180.

12 Id There is some indication, however, that the defendants did, at some point, request
that the plaintiffs not release the documents. In their letter to the defendants announcing
their intention to release the documents, the plaintiffs' counsel referred to "your letter [which]
has given us an opportunity to consider how we will handle the public release of such documents." Id at 181 n.4.
'3 Id at 181-82.
14 Although this article criticizes the breadth ofJudge Bazelon's language in Halkin, it is
not intended to question his very substantial contribution to first amendment law in general.
For a discussion of that contribution, see Brotman, Judge David Baze/on: Making the First
Amendment Work, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 39 (1981).
15 To some extent, Judge Bazelon may have relied on first amendment issues to justify
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Se 598 F.2d at 213-15 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (arguing that mandamus was inappropriate).
16 By the time Judge Bazelon wrote, the question of the release of the initial three documents had become moot because the New York Times reported on the contents of these
documents eight days after the trial court entered its protective order. 598 F.2d at 182.
17 See id at 188.
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materials obtained in discovery," ' he reasoned that the flexibile good
cause standard of rule 26(c) inadequately protected the substantial first
amendment interest in discovery materials. Thus, the majority held that
when a protective order "restricts expression," the first amendment
mandates a stricter standard and more elaborate findings.' 9 In dissent,
Judge Wilkey argued that the court should have retained the good cause
standard, asserting that the court's power to deny production implicitly
20
included the lesser power to restrict disclosure.
Few existing protective orders, if any, could satisfy Halkin's strict
requirements. As Judge Bazelon apparently intended, Halkin has made
the first amendment an important ingredient in protective order litigation. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric IndustrialCo. 21 is perhaps the
most striking example of this development. In Zenith, a massive antitrust action, the court entered an "umbrella" protective order early in
the case, permitting any party producing documents to designate them
confidential. Pursuant to that order, the parties designated hundreds of
thousands of documents confidential and some 385 pleadings and other
papers were filed in court under seal. After the parties completed extensive discovery, Judge Becker granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment.2 2 Notwithstanding the decision on the merits, Judge
Becker still had to contend with the plaintiffs' motion to vacate the protective order on the ground that it violated the first amendment. Even
though the plaintiffs themselves had vigorously used the "confidential"
stamp, 23 Judge Becker agonized at length over their constitutional and
common law arguments before concluding that only a portion of the
24
materials implicated any first amendment interests.
If Zenith represents the wave of the future, rule 1 interests may be
undermined by litigation about whether the court should issue a protective order or vacate one already in effect. Although most commentators
have inexplicably disregarded this consequence, 25 some judges clearly
18

Id

19 See id at 191-96. For a discussion of the Halkin standards, see inra text accompanying
notes 102-10.
20 598 F.2d at 205-09 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
21 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
22 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa.
1981), appealdocketed, No. 81-2331 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 1981).
23 Plaintiff Zenith had produced some 100,000 documents on paper preprinted with the
legend "confidential per court order." See 529 F. Supp. at 875 n.11.
24 See inra text accompanying notes 202-06 for a discussion of Judge Becker's rationale
in deciding which of the documents involved in the summary judgment decision to declassify.
25

The emerging issues relating to constitutional limitations on the power of courts to

enter protective orders have received substantial attention from the commentators, who, for
the most part, have been enthusiastic about this development. The bulk of this commentary
analyzes first amendment law in general and the prior restraint doctrine in particular. None
of it does more than acknowledge the possibility that this development may disrupt civil
discovery. See Dore, Confidentiality Orders-The ProperRole of the Courts in Providing Confidential
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and understandably are upset at the prospect. 26 To the extent that
Halkin will increase wasteful protective order litigation, the existing
good cause standard is preferable. In an attempt to demonstrate that
such a ruinous course is unnecessary, this article begins in Part I with a
brief survey of the current role of protective orders in discovery. In Part
II, the article explores Halkin's potential impact on that reality. Part III
then argues that the public access approach is a myth not only contrary
to reality, but also lacking legal support. In place of the broad public
access approach, it identifies the specific situations in which nonparty
access to confidential discovery materials is justified. Finally, Part IV
rebuts Halkin's assumption that the Federal Rules contemplate unfettered disclosure of discovered material and argues that rule 1 interests
and privacy concerns command significant weight even against the first
amendment rights of the public and the litigants. Ultimately, the article urges courts to adopt a doctrine of waiver that forecloses any later
claim of a right to disclose material initially obtained under a protective
order. By discrediting the foundation of the public access approach to
discovery and formulating a doctrine to dispose of disclosure claims, this
27
article offers a means to save the reality from the myths.
TreatmentforInformation Disclosed Through the Pre-TrialDiscovery Process, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. I
(1978); Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1645
(1980); Note, The First Amendment Right to Disseminate Discovery Materials. In re Halkin, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1550 (1979); Note, ConstitutionalStandards Governing Issuance of Protective Orders
Pursuantto Fed R. Civ. P. 26(c) When Freedom of Speech is Restrained-In re Halkin 598 F.2d 176
(D.C. Cir. 1979), 52 TEMP. L.Q. 1197 (1979); Comment, In re San Juan Star: Discovery andthe
First Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 229 (1982); Comment, Protective OrdersProhibitingDissemination of DiscoveryInformation.- The First Amendment and Good Cause, 1980 DUKE L.J. 766; Recent
Decision, Ifthe Issuance ofa Protective Order Pursuant to FederalRule 26(c) Would Restrain Expression, The District Court Must Determine the Order's Constitutionality Under the First Amendment, 48
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 486 (1980); Comment, DiseminationofDiscovey Materialsis Constitutionally
Protected, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 424 (1980); Comment, Discovery and The First Amendment, 21
WM. & MARY L. REV. 331 (1979).
26 Some courts have not hidden their exasperation. For example, Justice Dolliver of the
Washington Supreme Court has described Halkin and its progeny as "the morass of rather
tendentious First Amendment commentary which has afflicted some of the federal courts in
recent cases." Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 98 Wash. 2d 226, 258, 654 P.2d 673, 691 (1982)
(Dolliver, J., concurring), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1983) (No. 82-1721).
27 It is worthwhile at the outset to note what is not involved in a constitutional analysis
of protective orders. First, such an order does not have the same effect as a "gag" order, which
forbids any discussion of a case. Such orders violate the first amendment. See, e.g., Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). Nonetheless, as acknowledged in Part IV, the
entry of a protective order may chill discussion of a particular case because the litigant subject to the order will be reluctant to talk about the case, fearing that his opponent will allege
that his statements are based on the confidential information.
Second, a protective order has no impact on a party's ability to disseminate information
obtained through means other than discovery. First amendment interests in dissemination
may exist even with respect to stolen information. See New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Bridge C.A.T. Assoc. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1983);
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1008 n.16 (3d Cir. 1976). Rule 26(c)
applies only to limitations on material obtained through judicial mechanisms. Therefore it
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I
THE REALITY OF DISCOVERY AND THE ROLE OF
PROTECTIVE ORDERS

To appreciate the reality of protective order litigation, one must
first appreciate the reality of discovery in general. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were designed to effect a revolution in litigation by
broadening the availability of discovery. 28 They did so, with the result
that the intrusiveness and burdensome nature of discovery is the most
cited objection to the litigation boom. As a former federal judge observed in 1976, "[a] foreigner watching the discovery proceedings in a
civil suit would never suspect that this country has a highly-prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the fourth amendment." 29 This concern is
not easily disregarded, particularly in view of the broad opportunity to
compel disclosure by nonparties, and the urge to restrain discovery is
hard .to resist. In 1980, three Justices of the Supreme Court dissented
from the promulgation of amendments to the Federal Rules' discovery
provisions on the ground that the amendments did not sufficiently curb
the overuse of discovery.30 Since then, the Court has amended the discovery rules to require courts to take a more active role in controlling
discovery. 3' Thus, the tide may be turning against intrusiveness.
The need to permit full preparation for trial is the normal justification for intrusion into the affairs of parties and nonparties. The
provides no basis for restraining disclosure of information obtained by other means. See International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1963); cf. Suburban Sew 'N
Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that privileged
materials stolen from defendant's garbage can by plaintiff may be used as evidence).
28 See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 2002-07 (1970); Holtzoff,
Orgin andSources of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (1955);
Developments in the Law--Discovey, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 950-51 (1961).
29 Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976).
30 See Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980) (Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting); cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 741 (1975) (discussing "possible abuse of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules" in securities cases).
31 The new amendments, which became effective on August 1, 1983, are designed to
curb abusive litigation and assure that the courts take a more active hand in managing discovery. See FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). Rule 11, as amended, applies
to all papers, including formal discovery, and imposes on the attorney signing such papers the
duty to make "reasonable inquiry. . . that it is not interposed for an improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Id at
167. Rule 26(b)(1) now authorizes courts to limit discovery when the party seeking discovery
has had adequate opportunity to complete discovery, when more convenient means of discovery are available, or when "the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs
of the case." Id at 172. Finally, and most significantly, rule 16, as amended, requires courts
to enter an order within 120 days of the filing of the complaint limiting the time in which the
parties must complete discovery. Id at 168-69. Thus, the amended discovery rules have
greatly expanded the role of the court in discovery. See generaly Marcus, Reducing Court Costs
andDelay: The PotentialImpact of the PoposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 66
JUDICATURE 363 (1983).
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Supreme Court, in its leading discovery case, Hickman v. Taylor,3 2 emphasized that full disclosure is at the heart of the discovery rules, which
were intended to enable the parties "to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. ' 33 Accordingly, the Court directed that "the discovery provisions are to be applied as broadly and
liberally as possible,"' 34 an admonition many lower courts took to heart.
Some lower courts, for example, have held that a lawyer's instruction to
a deposition witness to refuse to answer a question on the ground that
35
the question is irrelevant is improper behavior warranting sanctions.
Courts have extended this general presumption in favor of disclosure
into the area of confidential information. As the Tenth Circuit has explained, "[t]he need for the information is held paramount but reasonable protective measures are supplied to minimize the effect on [the
parties making the compelled disclosures]." ' 36 The reason for this attitude is that the use of discovered information should be limited to the
purpose for which its disclosure was compelled-preparation for trial.
Thus have protective orders removed some of the harsh edges of liberal
discovery.
Emphasizing the rationale underlying discovery helps to explain a
central psychological reality of discovery practice-the assumption that
any use of discovery materials except to prepare for trial is inappropriate. Indeed, attorneys arguing against the issuance of a formal protective order often proclaim their adherence to this view to assure nervous
adversaries that there is no need to worry that information they obtain
through discovery will be put to nonlitigation uses. Proving that this
32

329 U.S. 495 (1947).

33
34

Id
Id

35

See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1977); Interna-

at 501.
at 506.

tional Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 Fed. R. Serv.

2d (Callaghan) 632, 634 (D.D.C. 1981); United States v. IBM, 79 F.R.D. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518, 519-20 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446, 449-50 (D.D.C. 1965). Rule
30(c) itself states that "[e]vidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections." The
justification is that requiring answers over objections that the question is irrelevant expedites
the discovery process, although an exception is made, of course, where trade secrets or privi-

leged information is involved. Thus, even the elastic relevancy limitations ofrule 26 give way
in the deposition situation to expedite the process.

36 Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 964 (1966). Sometimes the need for confidentiality outweighs the interest of the
litigant in having the information. For example, in Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494
(N.D. I1. 1983), the defendant drug manufacturer, sued for injuries allegedly caused by the
drug DES, subpoenaed data compiled by a medical researcher who had spent years studying
the effects of DES. The witness resisted on the ground that breaching the confidentiality
under which he had been compiling information would destroy his research efforts. The
court granted his motion for a protective order against the discovery, in part, on the theory
that there is a first amendment interest that would be undercut by impairing the free flow of
information to medical researchers. See id at 500. One suspects that the court may have felt
that the defendant hoped to undermine the research effort.
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assumption exists is difficult, in part because it is so pervasive. 3 7 Even in
Halkin, where there existed no protective order or prior agreement that
the previously purged material be held in confidence, the plaintiffs felt
constrained to give the defendants one week's notice of their intent to
release discovered documents to the press. 38 The tendency of courts to
enter protective orders, sometimes sua sponte, 39 limiting the use of all
information produced through discovery to preparation for trial provides additional evidence of the existence of this assumption. 40 Even
though there was no formal protective order, at least one court has enforced such a restriction on the ground that because the parties under4 t
stood the practice it was tantamount to a stipulated Rule 26(c) order.
37 Faced with the challenge of Halkin, some courts are putting this previously unstated
assumption into words. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court recently described the underlying assumption as follows:
Parties seeking to utilize the processes of discovery necessarily acquaint themselves with the rules which attend that process. They know the purposes for
which discovery is intended, and that protective orders can be entered in the
discretion of the court. Attorneys are surely aware that it is improper to exploit the fruits of discovery by using them for other than authorized purposes.
It is true that no penalty can attach for such use if a protective order is not
obtained; but it is understood in the majority of cases that confidentiality will
be respected, thus removing the necessity of seeking such an order to protect
against unwanted publicity.
Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 98 Wash. 2d 226, 239 n.4, 654 P.2d 673, 681 n.4 (1982), cerl.
granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1721).
38 As indicated supra note 12, there was an indication that the defendants had requested
such notice. Absent an agreement to provide such notice, however, the plaintiffs would not
have been under an obligation to do so.
39 In Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1982), for example, the
trial court rejected the defendant's proposed protective order and directed instead that all
material obtained by the plaintiff through discovery be used only in preparation for the
litigation.
40 See, e.g., Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1982); Krause v.
Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 54 (1982); National Polymer
Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 420 (6th Cir. 1981); Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir. 1979); AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 595
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245,
246 (2d Cir. 1961); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.R.D. 424 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(documents disclosed by United States Department of Agriculture); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 578, 578 (Pretrial Order No. 44 governing all videotaped depositions), 587, 588 (Pretrial Order No. 42 governing all documents produced by the Environmental Protection Agency) (E.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. ARA Servs., Inc., 1978-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,250 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 70
F.R.D. 687, 689 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Textured Yarn Co. v. Burkhart-Schier Chem. Co., 41
F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION 311-15 (1982) (reproducing protective order entered in In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Litig. No. MDL 342 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1978)); Hazard & Rice, Judicial
Management ofthe PretrialProcess in Massive Litigation: SpecialMasters as Case Managers, 1982 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 375, 398 (describing order in UnitedStates v. AT&T that applied to
all documents produced).
41 GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 415 F. Supp. 129, 131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (limitation applied to all documents, not only those designated as confidential); cf Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (private prelitigation
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Parties desire to keep information confidential for many legitimate
reasons. Although some of these reasons might not constitute good
cause under rule 26(c), they are often important to the parties. For example, in an antitrust price-fixing case, one would ordinarily expect that
the defendants' principal concern would be to restrict the plaintiff's dissemination of information. Although that undoubtedly is a concern, the
defendants may be more concerned about turning over such information to any codefendant competitors, not only because the information is
a trade secret, but also because the exchange of such information is often
the predicate for a price-fixing claim. Even if this concern initially appears specious, the astute antitrust defendant desires to preclude any
possibility that the exchange of pricing information during discovery
will return to haunt him in a later antitrust proceeding. One can imagine other similar concerns about disclosure. Thus, a protective order
may protect a number of interests by precluding disclosure of otherwise
confidential information that may have untoward consequences wholly
unnecessary to the full preparation of the case for trial.
Against this background, it should come as no surprise that in complex cases the parties customarily stipulate to protective orders negotiated by opposing counsel. In recognition of the general confidentiality
of discovery, these negotiations normally focus on which protective devices the parties will use-e.g., limitations on access, separate storage,
and the designation of persons eligible for access-rather than on the
question of whether there should be an order limiting dissemination of
discovery materials. These stipulated orders, which usually provide
"umbrella" protection for all materials designated confidential by the
party producing them, have become the norm in many areas of federal
practice. Judge Becker acknowledged this reality in Zenith, observing
that he was "unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of even a
modicum of complexity where an umbrella protective order. .. has not
been agreed to by the parties and approved by the court. Protective
orders have been used so frequently that a degree of standardization is
appearing. '42 The parties agree to such orders in order to commence
discovery without the expense and delay involved in debating the scope
of protective provisions.
The standardized protective order forms confirm this practical oriagreement with respect to exchange of confidential materials held unenforceable against discovery request).
42
529 F. Supp. at 889. Even in Halkin, the court recognized that "[t]his procedure is
commonly used to preserve parties' right to assert claims of privilege with respect to particular documents in complex cases." 598 F.2d at 196 n.47. But qf United States v. Hooker
Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 1981):
[T]he fact that something may be the general practice does not mean that the
practice must be adopted by an unwilling party. The State is certainly within
its rights to demand that Hooker make the requisite showing if it believes the
confidentiality claim would be used haphazardly like a "rubber stamp."
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entation. The Handbook ofRecommended Proceduresfor the Trial of Protracted
Cases, introduced in 1960, proposed that courts should routinely enter
protective orders covering all confidential information produced
through discovery. 43 The Handbook's successor, the Manualfor Complex
Lit'gation, sets forth an instructive sample protective order. 44 This order
permits the party producing material to designate as confidential a
broad range of commercial information. 45 The discovering party may
disclose such information only to counsel of record and other "qualified
persons" involved in preparation for trial, whom the discovering party
has previously identified to the producing party. 46 The sample order
further directs counsel to designate as confidential all summaries or exhibits that they have prepared using designated information. 4 7 The discovering party must return all designated information, including any
43

HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED

PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED

CASES, Sample Form No. 4 pt. II, para. 6, reprntedin 25 F.R.D 351, 447 (1960) (adopted by

Judicial Conference in March, 1960) (such information "shall be used for no purpose other
than for preparation for trial in this case.").
44
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II, § 2.50, at 357 (5th ed. 1982). For other
examples of protective orders, see W. SCHWARZER, supra note 40, at 235-37, 311-15, 405-10
(reproducing protective orders entered in several recent cases).
45 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II, § 2.50, at 357-58, para. 1 (5th ed.
1982). This paragraph identifies financial, engineering, and marketing information and information relating to business plans as information eligible for designation. The paragraph
further provides, however, that "[it] shall not be deemed to exclude any other type or classification of documents for which confidentiality is claimed by a party." Whether this provision
is limited to matters included within rule 26(c)(7) is unclear. Consequently, the parties may
devise their own version of confidentiality. Such liberties with the definition of confidentiality become significant when a challenge to the designation of certain materials comes before
the court. The parties may then argue that the court should apply the order's definition of
confidentiality rather than the definition in rule 26(c)(7). Although the fact that the order
must be based on rule 26(c) may appear to undercut this argument, it must be remembered
that the court does have broad discretion. Absent such a motion, however, protective provisions can apply to materials that would not otherwise qualify for protection under rule
26(c)(7). Oddly enough, the Manual's sample order does not contain an express provision
relating to a possible challenge to a party's designation. Under the sample order, then, a
court may have no occasion to limit the protective provisions to materials that would invoke
rule 26(c) protections.
46 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II, § 2.50, at 358, para. 2 (5th ed. 1982).
The sample order designates as qualified persons only counsel of record. Any other person,
including the client, must execute an affidavit stating that he will obey the order. See Note,
Balancing Competing Discovery Interests in the Context of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Trilemma, 56
S. CAL. L. REv. 115 (1983) (arguing that prohibiting disclosure to clients strains attorneyclient relationship).
The sample order further requires that the party producing the confidential material be
given advance notice so that he may object to the inclusion of this new person. Such a provision, however, arguably invades the attorney's work product to the extent that it requires the
identification of expert consultants retained by the attorney, whose identity would not otherwise have to be revealed. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Under the sample order, the
attorney, prior to allowing such expert consultants to inspect designated materials, must first
notify the producing party that the consultant has become a "qualified person." This matter
is, of course, a proper subject for negotiation in the drafting of a stipulated protective order.
47 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II, § 2.50, at 359, para. 6 (5th ed. 1982).
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documents prepared by counsel, to the producing party at the termination of the litigation. 48 In the interim, the order strictly limits the use of
the information; it provides that persons receiving confidential documents or information through their participation in the litigation "shall
not disclose such confidential documents, their contents, or any portion
or summary thereof to any person or persons not involved in the con49
duct of this litigation."
Thus, protective order practice has effected substantial limitations
on the dissemination of discovery material without substantial court involvement. The parties are often overzealous in designating materials
confidential. In Zenith, for example, plaintiff Zenith produced some
100,000 pages of material on paper preprinted with a confidentiality
designation. 50 In some cases, the parties designate every document produced confidential. 5' The availability and frequent use of substantial
confidentiality protections should minimize concerns about the possible
misuse of information and, at the same time, maximize access to it.
The assumption of confidentiality carries over into the conduct of
the discovery process. Far from being open to the public, discovery actually occurs in private. For example, much of the information collected in preparation for litigation is gathered through investigation
conducted by or for counsel rather than through formal discovery. In
accordance with the belief of many judges and attorneys that investigation is the most important part of pretrial preparation, the public interest in prediscovery investigation should be equal to the public interest in
formal discovery. Although some have argued that such investigation is
sufficiently formal to warrant court supervision,5 2 in practice this investigation remains a private affair. The work product doctrine generally
48

See id. at 359-60, para. 7. Because counsel's own summaries are confidential materials

within the meaning of the order, a judge should normally exempt work product materials
from the duty to return. Courts treat the obligation to return discovered documents quite

seriously. For example, in Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770 (9th
Cir. 1983), the trial court held the plaintiff in contempt for failure to return documents at the

end of the litigation, as required by the protective order. A divided panel of the court of
appeals reversed the finding of contempt on the ground that there was insufficient evidence
that Falstaff had wilfully violated the protective order. It did, however, affirm the district
court's order awarding defendants more than $27,000 in attorney's fees in connection with
proceedings regarding the failure to return the documents.

49

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II, § 2.50, at 358, para. 3 (5th ed. 1982).

50
529 F. Supp. at 875 n.I 1. Judge Becker noted further that "the parties had long since
gone far beyond erring on the side of caution and had stamped 'confidential' on their submissions and discovery materials almost as a matter of course." Id at 878.
51
According to the brief for the United States in opposition to the petition for certiorari

in AT&T v. AfCI Communications Corp., AT&T not only treated all documents produced as
confidential but also designated every page of every deposition as confidential, often before
the deposition had commenced. See Brief for the United States In Opposition to Petition for

Certiorari at 4, AT&T v. MCI Communications Corp., 695 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
52 See United States v. IBM, 415 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (rejecting defendant's
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shields such investigation from discovery; 53 not even the adverse party,
much less the general public, has a right to information obtained
54
through prediscovery investigation.
Formal discovery under the Federal Rules is often no more public
than the investigation process. Indeed, the principal distinction between investigation and formal discovery is that investigation is carried
on without notice to the other parties to the lawsuit. The private character of formal discovery is the result of two factors. First, reliable public notice about the actual time and place of pretrial discovery is rare.
Although the rules authorize the parties to initiate formal discovery by
filing notices in court, 55 much discovery, particularly by deposition, is
often scheduled informally without any filing. Even when the parties
have filed a notice, discovery is often rescheduled to accommodate the
calendars of the lawyers, the parties, or the witnesses.
Second, and more significantly, pretrial discovery usually takes
place in law offices or on other private property. 56 Document inspection
and depositions lie at the heart of the pretrial preparation process. Both
of these activities ordinarily occur either in the lawyer's offices, on the
producing party's business premises, or at some other private place. Although the deposing party must obtain a court order to exclude the
other party from a deposition, 57 no court order is required to exclude
nonparties who simply evince an interest in observing the deposition.
Thus, even if a newspaper reporter or some other nonparty were to present himself at the right time and place, the parties could legally refuse to

argument that interviews conducted on plaintiff's behalf using FBI agents are "virtually
depositions").
53
The protection is implicit in the work product doctrine for, as Justice Jackson put it,
"[d]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions...
on wits borrowed from the adversary." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
54 There are circumstances, however, where discovery is allowed for the fruits of investigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (allowing discovery of some witness statements and, on a
showing of substantial need, other work product); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (B) (allowing discovery of facts known or opinions held by an expert employed in anticipation of litigation but
not expected to testify (i.e., for investigative purposes) only under "exceptional
circumstances").
55 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30-34.
56 This observation, of course, applies only to depositions and document inspection and
is not true with respect to written discovery mechanisms such as interrogatories and requests
for admissions. But interrogatories and requests for admissions tend by their very nature to
be so general or so specific that they do not set forth or explain the really significant details
unearthed by the other forms of discovery.
57 See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973); Metal Foil Prods. Mfg. Co. v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 55 F.R.D. 491 (E.D. Va. 1970). Several courts have held that rule 615
of the Federal Rules of Evidence is applicable to an attempt to exclude a party's retained
expert from a deposition. See, e.g., Williams v. Elec. Control Systems, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 703
(E.D. Tenn. 1975).
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admit him. Public access to document inspections, which often occur on
the producing party's business premises, is similarly limited.
According to the Federal Rules, then, the public has neither the
opportunity nor the right to observe discovery. For some discovery activities, however, the Federal Rules appear to require a public record of the
fruits of the activity. That appearance, however, is largely misleading.
Document inspection, despite its central importance to pretrial preparation, produces no public record. 58 Instead, the inspecting party normally
obtains copies of the documents it deems relevant for future use in the

case. These documents are not filed in court, and no record is made of
the documents not copied. Although the Federal Rules have traditionally required that the parties file interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admissions, and deposition transcripts, under the 1980
amendments courts may order that these materials not be filed.5 9 Even

before the amendments, a Federal Judicial Center study showed that
the parties neglected to record twenty-five percent of all discovery activity. 60 As a result of the 1980 amendments, which were designed as a
space saving measure, there may be no public record of such discovery
materials even though no party has alleged that they contain confiden-

tial information. Indeed, many district courts have adopted local rules
that eliminate filing of some or all of these discovery materials. 6' In
58 A deposition may be taken in connection with the production of documents by a third
party. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b). Even then, however, a substantial public record very rarely
is generated.
59 In 1980, rule 5(d) was amended to provide that a "court may on motion of a party or
on its own initiative order that depositions upon oral examination and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed
unless on order of the court." The Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association had
urged a change in the mandatory filing provisions which would have amended rule 5(d) to
forbid filing except by court order. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (1977), reprintedin 92 F.R.D. 149,
156-57 (1977). Several states have such a rule. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030 (West
Supp. 1983). The shift to a rule of nonfiling excited some opposition, however. See REPORT
OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION TO THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COMMITTEE AND THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE SEVENTH

FEDERAL

CIRCUIT (1979), reprintedin 86 F.R.D. 267, 284-85 (1979) (arguing that having discovery on

file assists court in keeping tabs on parties' progress in discovery). The amendment was, thus,
a compromise, requiring action to terminate the filing requirement rather than action to
reinstate it. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules noted that "such materials are
sometimes of interest to those who may have no access to them except by a requirement of
filing, such as members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public generally." FED.
R. CIV. P. 5(d) advisory committee note. One commentator has labeled the amendment
"misguided" precisely because it will impair public access to discovery materials. See Note,
Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials in the Federal Courts, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1085, 1095 n.51
(1981).
60
P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL
LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 27 (1978); cf Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979)
("Because the case was settled, respondent's sworn deposition was never made part of the
court record.").
61
Many district courts have adopted local rules providing that the parties are not to file
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addition, where deposition transcripts are filed, many district courts
have local rules that either prohibit public access to the materials or
keep them under seal until the court orders them unsealed or until one
of the parties formally requests that the court make them available to
the public. 62 Even where the local rules provide that, deposition transcripts shall be kept in an open file, access to the records is still effecsome or all discovery materials in court unless so ordered by the court or if the materials are
needed in connection with motion proceedings. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 6(d) (all discovery);
S.D. CAL. R. 230-4 (interrogatories, requests for admissions), 231-7 (depositions); M.D. FLA.
R. 3.03(c) (interrogatories), 3.03(d) (depositions); N.D. GA. R. 181.2 (all discovery), 211.1
(depositons); C.D. ILL. R. 17 (all discovery); S.D. ILL. R. 16 (all discovery); N.D. & S.D. IowA
R. 2.3.33 (interrogatories); D. MINN. R. 8B(d) (all discovery); D. MONT. R. 8(c) (all discovery); D.N.H.R. 39 (all discovery); S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 19 (all discovery); E.D.N.C.R. 3.09 (all
discovery); D. OR. R. 120-4(a) (all discovery); D.P.R.R. 10 (all discovery); D.R.I.R. 13(a)
(interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admissions), 14(b) (depositions); D.S.C.
Order of June 12, 1978, re Filing of Discovery (all discovery); M.D. TENN. R. 9(c)(1) (only
depositions to be used in evidence, all interrogatories, requests for admissions, requests for
documents); W.D. TEX. R. 300-6 (interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admissions); W.D. WASH. Civ. R. 33(e) (interrogatories, requests for documents). For analogous
state provisions, see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 2019(0(1), 2030(b) (West Supp. 1983).
It appears that the courts promulgated these rules to save space; several of the rules
explicitly state that as their purpose. Only one, however, has made any provision for assuring
the public some access to unfiled discovery materials: "During the pendency of any civil
proceeding, any person may, with leave of court obtained after notice served on all parties to
the action, obtain a copy of any deposition or discovery documents not on file with the court
u.on payment of the expense of the copy." D. OR. R. 120-4(b). The rule gives no indication
,f the showing, if any, that a person must make to justify the granting of such leave of court.
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that access is only by leave of court because such permission
presumably would be unnecessary if the nonparty had an absolute right to obtain a copy of
the materials.
62
Many courts have special rules limiting public access to deposition transcripts that
are on file. These rules generally provide that the transcripts will remain sealed even though
they are on file. See, e.g., D. ALAsKA R. 8(A) (public inspection allowed only on order of
court); S.D. CAL. R. 231-6 (clerk shall reseal the deposition after filing); D. CONN. R. 8(b)
(depositions withheld from public inspection); C.D. ILL. R. 16 (deposition opened only at
request of party or order of court); N.D. IND. R. 20 (unless otherwise ordered by the court,
deposition opened only at request of party, judge, or member of judge's staff); D. KAN. R.
17(c) (deposition opened at request of attorney of record); D. MASs. R. 14(b) (deposition
opened at request of attorney of record); D.N.D.R. 13 (deposition opened only on order of
court); S.D. OHIO R. 4.6.2 (deposition opened only at direction of court or request of attorney
of record); E.D. OKLA. R. 14 (deposition opened by order of court or written application by
attorney of record); N.D. OKLA. R. 15 (deposition opened by order of court or on written
application by attorney of record); W.D. OKLA. R. 15 (deposition opened by order of court or
on written application by attorney of record); S.D. TEX. R. 10E (deposition opened on application by counsel of record or order of court); S.D. W. VA. R. 2.08 (deposition opened on
order of court or written request of party); W.D. Wis. R. 19 (deposition opened only on
request of party); D. Wyo. R. 7(c) (deposition opened on application by attorney of record,
then immediately resealed).
Arguably these limitations are inconsistent with rule 30(0. According to Professors
Wright and Miller, "[u]pon filing the deposition should be immediately opened by the clerk,
and made available for public inspection, unless the court has made a protective order that
the deposition remain sealed." 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2119, at 438
(1970) (footnotes omitted). For a case overturning a local rule limiting access to filed deposition transcripts under an analogous state procedure, see Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Willis,
370 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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tively limited because the filing occurs only after the deposition is
completed.6 3 Furthermore, the public access is restricted to reading the
transcript in the clerk's office; such access does not include the right to
64
copy the transcript.
Even in the absence of a protective order, then, the filing provisions
provide little reliable access to any discovery materials prior to trial.
The actual privacy afforded pretrial proceedings is further buttressed by
the entry of customary umbrella protective orders authorizing the filing
65
under seal of confidential materials.
In sum, discovery is not a public process. The public has no reliable method for determining when or where discovery proceedings will
take place and no absolute right to attend them even if aware of the
time and place. The fruits of discovery are often not filed in court, and,
even when they are, the public may not have access to them. All of this
is consistent with the underlying assumption of the litigants and the
courts that discovery compels the disclosure of information solely to assist preparation for trial. This assumption, in turn, regularly leads parties to agree, and courts to order, that such information be put to no
other use. The reality against which constitutional and common law
issues should be assessed is, therefore, a reality of confidentiality-one
that is inherent in the discovery process and essential if parties are to
avoid the unwarranted harm that may result from the intrusiveness of
modern discovery.
II
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON REALITY OF THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS APPROACH

The cases endorsing a public right of access to discovery materials
or emphasizing the parties' first amendment right to disseminate those
materials offer a picture of the discovery process dramatically different
from the reality described above. Rather than emphasizing the speedy

resolution of private disputes, these courts suggest that litigation is imbued with a public interest that warrants access to all phases of the litigation process. Before addressing the potential impact of these decisions
63

Indeed, in some places even then the reporter may not file the deposition transcript.

See C.P.C. Partnership Bardot Plastics, Inc. v. P.T.R., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 184, 185 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (noting that practice in Eastern District of Pennsylvania is for reporter to give deposition transcript to deposing attorney, leaving it to attorney to file transcript himself).
64 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(l)(2) (requiring that reporter furnish copy of transcript to

deponent or anyparty upon payment of reasonable charge). At best, thepublic has an opportunity to read the original in the clerk's office.
65 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II, § 2.50, at 359, para. 5 (5th ed. 1982).
But cf Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that district court order sealing all files "impermissibly reverse[d] the 'presumption
of openness' that characterizes criminal proceedings").
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on existing reality, it is useful to note the assumptions on which these
courts have based their opinions.
Courts that reject requests for protective orders, frequently assert
that "pretrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling
reasons exist for denying the public access to the proceedings. ' 66 In addition, these courts emphasize the role that litigation plays in the resolution of major social issues while down-playing its function in resolving
private disputes. In Halkin, for example, the majority stated that
"[1]itigation itself is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. '6 7 Other courts have emphasized the utility of litigation as a device for unearthing wrongs. The Seventh Circuit noted that
many important social issues became entangled to some degree in civil
litigation. Indeed, certain civil suits may be instigated for the very
purpose of gaining information for the public. .

.

.Civil litigation in

general often exposes the need for governmental action or correction.
68
Such revelations should not be kept from the public.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has implied that discovery serves in part to
"force a full disclosure" to the public69 and the District of Columbia
Circuit in Halkin viewed with equanimity the possibility of using civil
litigation as an alternative to the Freedom of Information Act to obtain
information in the government's possession. 70 At least one commentator
has ventured to posit situations in which "even though the litigants may
be perfectly willing to keep the facts of the litigation to themselves, the
public interest requires that they not be permitted to do so."' The
66 AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978),cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979);see
also Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 28 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 478
F. Supp. 756, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[S]ecrecy is the exception, not the rule."); Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 340 (.. .E.D. Pa. 1972) ("[P]re-trial proceedings of the federal judicial
system are conducted in public .... ");Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48
F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969) ("[A]s a general proposition, trial and pre-trial proceedings of
the federal judicial system are ordinarily conducted in public.").
67 598 F.2d at 187 (citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978) and NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963)). Primus and Button both addressed the propriety of invoking the
rules of professional conduct to restrict lawyers' use of litigation as a device to achieve social
or political ends. For a discussion of the special problems that arise from the use of protective
orders in public interest litigation, see infa text accompanying notes 282-87. For the present,
it is sufficient to note that in each such case the goal sought by public interest litigation was
judicial relief, rather than court-assisted access to otherwise unavailable information.
68 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976). Although the quoted comments were generally directed toward rules
restricting attorney comment in all cases, other courts have relied on them in protective order
cases. See, e.g., Inre Halkin, 598 F.2d at 187.
69 See Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900
(1964).
70 Thus, Judge Wilkey observed in dissent that the plaintiffs could have used the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), to obtain the materials in question. See 598
F.2d at 207 n.30 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
71 Dore, supra note 25, at 15.
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prospect exists, then, that a court may find that the public interest compels dissemination of discovered materials even over the objections of all
the parties, an odd inversion of the litigants' first amendment rights of
free expression.
In evaluating the first amendment rights of the parties to disseminate information obtained through discovery, those courts that endorse
broad access to'discovery materials begin with the presumption that the
public has a right to such access. The public's alleged right to access,
therefore, serves as an important backdrop against which these courts
evaluate the litigants' first amendment rights to disclose discovered
materials. These courts counter the contention that discovery exists
solely for trial preparation by asserting that the Federal Rules presume
unfettered use of discovery materials not covered by protective orders,
thereby undercutting further the propriety of disclosure restrictions.
To protect both the alleged public interest in access and the first
amendment rights of the litigants, these courts insist that the party seeking limitations on dissemination make a detailed showing of need and
that judges rigorously scrutinize that showing. Consequently, these
courts view protective orders as the exception, rather than the rule, even
in complex cases in which protective order litigation is most burdensome
to both the courts and the parties.
This approach not only disregards the realities of discovery and the
current use of protective orders, but also threatens to exert a "pernicious
effect on the smooth functioning of the discovery system."172 Recognition of a first amendment right of access to discovered information
would undermine litigants' confidence in protective orders. If one takes
these decisions at face value, the party that produces information under
shield of a protective order must realize that the continued confidentiality of the information depends more on the opposing litigant's whim in
exercising his first amendment "right" to disclose the information than
on the court's power to limit dissemination. This atmosphere of uncertainty is combined with the formidable burden of establishing a record
sufficient to justify entry of a protective order. Together, mistrust of protective orders and the extensive record that the party requesting the order must compile threaten to eliminate stipulated protective orders,
increase the risk that the parties will not disclose relevant information,
impose substantial but unnecessary burdens on the litigants and the
courts, and, in at least some cases, imperil the ability of the parties to
reach settlements contingent on continued confidentiality. Courts that
72

Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also In re

San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115-16 (lst Cir. 1981); Note, The Work Product Doctrine in
Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 412, 436 & n.167 (1983) (describing uncertainty of
protective orders and noting impact of Halkin).
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endorse the right of access, however, neglect to address these potential
consequences.
A.

Stipulated Orders

The proliferation of stipulated protective orders enabled litigants to
proceed with litigation and relieved courts of the burden of resolving
discovery disputes. In view of the current trend, one must ask whether
courts can continue to enter, and litigants continue to rely on, protective
orders. The answers are unclear but ominous. Protective orders obviously are of little value if parties cannot rely on them. Yet the suggestion that the public interest in access to discovery materials may
outweigh the parties' desire that these materials remain confidential certainly calls into question the parties' ability to stipulate to protective
orders barring public access. Stipulated orders are, therefore, inherently
inconsistent with right of access cases. To the degree that one accepts
the broader assertions of those cases, stipulated orders may be ineffective
against nonparties.
Of more practical importance is the view that the first amendment
interests of the litigants preclude entry of protective orders absent a detailed showing that a compelling need for confidentiality exists. Arguably, a court must actually scrutinize the allegedly confidential materials
before it issues an order, but courts do not follow this procedure in stipulated order situations. Although Judge Bazelon acknowledged in Ha/kin
that umbrella orders might be appropriate in some cases, 73 the hurdles
placed in the way of such orders may effectively make them unavailable.
One could attempt to avoid the constitutional and common law
conflicts posed by this problem by asserting that conventional stipulated
protective orders are not actually restraints on expression. Such orders
do not purport to represent a judicial determination that certain materi74
Usuals are so confidential as to warrant restrictions on expression.
ally, they permit any party to challenge the confidentiality designation
and obtain a ruling on the issue. 75 At that point the burden of showing
that the designated materials are confidential falls on the producing
party. 76 Until a court invalidates a party's designation of materials as
confidential, however, the order genuinely restricts disclosure and repre73
See 598 F.2d at 196 n.47 (noting that such "flexibility" may be appropriate in cases
"where the discovery embraces a large quantity of documents").
74
See supra note 45. The party makes the designation, not the court, and may do so
according to standards that appear broader than rule 26(c)(7).
75 As indicated, supra note 45, this is not always so; the sample order in the Aanualfor
Complex Litigation contains no such provision. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II,
§ 2.50, at 357 (5th ed. 1982). Halkin implies, however, that it is constitutionally required. See
598 F.2d at 196 n.47.
76
Halkin implies that the Constitution requires the producing party to bear the burden
of proving confidentiality. See also Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24, 29 n.3 (D.D.C. 1981).
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sents an actual restraint. 77
The prospect of a subsequent judicial determination of the propriety of confidentiality designations may not, as a practical matter, be the
equivalent of an initial finding that the parties should hold the materials
in confidence. Although the burden remains on the producing party to
make the requisite showing to justify confidentiality if a designation is
challenged, courts often relax the standard in the absence of manifest
abuse in the designation process. By the time the objection to the
designation occurs, it is too late for the court to deny access to the
materials altogether. Moreover, it often may be impractical for the
court to try to review all designated materials simply because a party
has challenged their designation. In Zenith, for example, Judge Becker
simply refused to entertain the plaintiffs' motion for wholesale declassification, requiring them, instead, to designate specific materials. 78 Given
79
the prospect of having to review hundreds of thousands of documents,
his action is not surprising. As a practical matter, then, the burden to
justify confidentiality falls on the producing party only when the party
challenging the confidentiality designation identifies specific documents,
77 For a case in which the court affirmed a contempt citation under analogous circumstances, see Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (suit to recover for
injuries received in auto crash). The defendant resisted discovery and sought a protective
order. The court ordered production and, rejecting the defendant's proposed protective order, directed the parties to use all materials produced solely for purposes of the litigation.
One of the documents produced was an index prepared by the defendant of various crash
tests it had performed on its cars. The plaintiff's expert, without seeking to have the order
modified, displayed the index while being interviewed on the ABC television program
"20/20," and also gave a copy of the index to an attorney who had retained him to assist in
another suit against the defendant. The trial court held that each action constituted contempt and fined the expert $10,000.
The appellate court held that the television episode "came within a scintilla" of contempt but did not actually constitute contempt because the document was not legible to
viewers. Id at 974. It therefore reversed the contempt finding on that count but affirmed the
contempt finding on the alternative ground of disclosure to the second lawyer and remanded
for a recalculation of the fine. On remand, the trial court assessed a fine of $8,000. Letter
from Louis Long (attorney for Volkswagen) to Richard Marcus (Nov. 16, 1982) (copy on file
at Comell Law Review). Although the sensitivity of the document probably was a factor in
determining the amount of the fine, the case shows that unmodified orders that apply to a
broad range of documents are genuine restraints on expression.
78 529 F. Supp. at 894 ("A party seeking wholesale declassification must first attempt to
justify the investment ofjudicial and private resources demanded by such an exercise. Thus,
to this extent, wholesale declassification shifts part of the burden to the party seeking disclosure.") (citations omitted).
79 It is not clear from Judge Becker's opinion exactly how many documents the parties
designated confidential, but the figures provided suggest the magnitude of the problem. The
defendants produced some 35,000,000 documents. Id at 874 n.6. Plaintiff Zenith designated
more than 100,000 documents confidential, id at 875 n. 11, and defendant Hitachi designated
an estimated 77,000 documents confidential, id at 874 n.6. Indeed, plaintiffs final pretrial
statement contained some 17,000 pages and cross-referenced some 250,000 documents. Id at
873. Thus, Judge Becker clearly faced the prospect of reviewing hundreds of thousands of
documents to decide the wholesale disclosure motion.
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which in most cases will be a finite number. 80 Thus, the restraint applies not only until the court hears a challenge to a specified number of
documents, but also for all time on most designated documents.
Notwithstanding the wishes of some courts to the contrary, the reality of the restraint will not go away. In an attempt to soften this reality,
Judge Becker expressed "doubt that any judge would approve a consent
order not demonstrably rooted in Rule 26(c)," 8' suggesting that courts
should scrutinize consent orders to guard against invasion of first
amendment rights. This solution, although commendable, is unrealistic.
The principal problem with the solution is that the court has no method
of obtaining the information it needs to undertake rigorous first amendment analysis. Ordinarily, the court has only the stipulated order before
it. That order may, but probably will not,8 2 contain recitations about
the confidentiality of the protected materials. It is hardly likely, however, that the order will provide the requisite information for the court
to rule on the confidentiality question. Neither the parties nor the court
know at the time of stipulation which documents will later be designated confidential. Furthermore, bare assertions of counsel, such as recitations in the stipulated order, are said to be insufficient to support the
issuance of protective orders. 83 Thus, reliance on recitations to support
a protective order appears unjustified, even if the recitations are specific.
Finally, it is not at all clear what a determination in conjunction with
the signing of a stipulated order would actually decide. Although
wholesale declassification is not a reasonable possibility, the court
should not attempt to prejudge the appropriateness of individual designations. However particular the description, it is possible that a party
will misuse the confidentiality stamp. Scrutiny of the first amendment
issues at the stipulation stage is therefore not only time-consuming but
unworkable.
In sum, parties may no longer rely on stipulated orders. A court
cannot engage in the strict scrutiny requisite to entry of a valid order at
the time stipulated orders are entered. To dispense with such scrutiny,
however, renders the order vulnerable to later attack on those very same
grounds, thereby undercutting the reliability of the order. A person
confronted by a discovery request is, therefore, more likely to try to per80

It should be noted that even the Hakin court seemed to abjure the blanket declassifi-

cation motion. After entry of an umbrella order, it sought to preserve only the right to seek
declassification of "a particular document." See 598 F.2d at 196 n.47.
81 529 F. Supp. at 889 n.40. The Halkin majority seemingly made the same assumption.
Thus, although he acknowledged that umbrella orders might be permissible in cases involving
large numbers of documents, Judge Bazelon was careful to insist that such orders be entered
only "on a proper showing." 598 F.2d at 196 n.47.
82 Given the elasticity of the definition of confidentiality ordinarily encountered in stipulated protective orders, see supra note 45, it is unlikely that particularized recitations will be
included.
83 See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2035, at 265 (1970).
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suade the court to deny discovery altogether, thereby enmeshing the
court and the parties in unwanted and unnecessary litigation. The
threatened demise of the stipulated order thus promotes unnecessary
discovery disputes.
B.

The Risk of Nondisclosure

The demise of the stipulated protective order not only threatens to
impose unwanted disputes on the litigants and the courts, but also increases the risk that information that previously would have been disclosed will be withheld. Because such a result would strike at the very
heart of the discovery scheme, it cannot be lightly disregarded. This risk
exists for two reasons.
First, there will be an increase in attempts to persuade courts to
deny discovery altogether on the ground that once information is produced no order can effectively protect its confidentiality. Some of these
efforts will be successful. Although Judge Bazelon suggested in Halkin
that a court may not deny a party the "statutory right of discovery"
absent a showing that would justify a protective order, 84 he did acknowledge that no constitutional right to discovery exists. 8 5 Moreover,
because the statutory right is explicitly limited by a court's rule 26(c)
power to deny discovery, there is no doubt that courts may deny discovery they previously would have permitted. Thus, one district court,
while declining to enter a protective order restraining the plaintiff's disclosure of matters already obtained through discovery, observed that
"the penchant of the plaintiff to try her case in the media may become a
consideration in determining the scope of discovery to be afforded
her." 86 Other courts have echoed the same view. 8 7 Thus, by following
the Halkin approach and limiting protective orders, courts may, ironically, undermine the traditional premise that "[t]he need for the information is held paramount." 88
Second, the producing party may fail to disclose information as
readily as in the past. Because of the broad scope of discovery, the
temptation to evade it has always been great. Many a defendant has
suspected that the plaintiff sought certain information more for ulterior
84 598 F.2d at 190 n.27.
85 Id at 190.
86 Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471,482 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Interestingly, the court declined to enter the protective order in part because of constitutional limitations on its power to do so. Thus, the perceived impact of the first amendment on the court's
power to restrict dissemination encouraged the judge to limit discovery.
87 See In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (Ist Cir. 1981) ("If the trial judge were
required to allow virtually full publicity of utterances forced from the mouth of an unwilling
deponent . . . he might well refuse to allow the discovery to proceed at all . .

").

88 Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 964 (1965).
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purposes than for trial preparation.8 9 Indeed, one court has observed
that the elimination of restrictions on disclosure of discovery material
creates "substantial incentives for plaintiffs to depose well-known individuals who would not otherwise be deposed, or ask them questions that
might not otherwise be asked." 90 The entry of a reliable protective order prohibiting misuse of information obtained through discovery both
placates the person subject to discovery and reduces the temptation to
disregard the obligation to produce the requested information. Undercutting the court's power and ability to enter such orders has the opposite effect.
Courts have a limited ability to deal with such admittedly contumacious behavior. Particularly when the person against whom discovery is sought is a nonparty, the temptation to withhold information is
very great. Consider, for example, the nonparty witness served with a
subpoena duces tecum by a competitor who is the defendant in an antitrust case. The information sought may, in the witness's opinion, be
highly sensitive and likely to enable the defendant competitor to gain an
unfair competitive advantage. Can the courts blithely assume that this
nonparty witness will comply with its discovery obligations? The common sense answer is no, and the courts understand this reality. The
Second Circuit recently observed that "[u]nless a valid Rule 26(c) protective order is to be fully and fairly enforceable, witnesses relying upon
such orders will be inhibited from giving essential testimony in civil liti89 See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1495
(7th Cir. 1983) ("Discovery of sensitive documents is sometimes sought not in a sincere effort
to gather evidence for use in a lawsuit but in an effort to coerce the adverse party, regardless
of the merits of the suit, to settle it in order not to have to disclose sensitive materials.").
90 In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 118 n.3 (lst Cir. 1981). It appears that the
First Circuit's concerns in San JuanStar were warranted. The underlying lawsuit asserted that
a number of law enforcement officials, including the Governor of Puerto Rico, had violated
the civil rights of two terrorists who had been killed in a gun battle with police. The district
court ultimately granted the Governor's motion for summary judgment and awarded him
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981), explaining in part as follows:
Finally, the Court observes that creating publicity and obtaining political advantage have been part of plaintiffs' motivation in bringing this case.
The Court makes this finding based upon the approach taken by plaintiffs'
counsel from the outset and the Court's observations of these proceedings.
For example, during the early stages of the case, plaintiffs' counsel sought to
depose the Governor on July 24, 1979, at the Puerto Rico Bar Association, at
a time obviously calculated to create maximum publicity since it was immediately before the first anniversary of the shootout at which Soto and Rosado
were killed. In addition, their counsel have frequently publicized information
obtained through discovery in these proceedings and have apparently been in
frequent contact with reporters. At the same time, they refused to agree to a
protective order which would have given them access to discovery materials
in August 1979; and they have unsuccessfully challenged routine protective
orders and restrictions on the dissemination of information obtained during
discovery.
Soto v. Romero Barcel6, 559 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.P.R. 1983) (footnote omitted).
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gation." 9' Indeed, there is some indication that the converse may also
be true. For example, one trial court found that "defendants waived
objections to interrogatories, and provided a fuller disclosure than might
otherwise have been required of them, . . .all in reliance upon the entry and continuing effectiveness of the protective orders. '92 It seems undeniable, then, that the eclipse of protective orders will not only cause
courts to refrain from ordering production, but also will tempt persons
to withhold information even in the face of court-ordered production.
C.

The Judicial Burden of Resolving Confidentiality Issues

The Hakin approach, by placing limitations on the trial court's discretion to issue protective orders, is likely to breed protective order litigation. This Section analyzes the burdens on the courts in resolving
these disputes, which may increase substantially.
Even without Ha/kin's stringent requirements, the resolution of disputed confidentiality issues under the good cause standard is often an
extremely time-consuming process for the parties and the court. Often
courts require a particularized and specific factual demonstration before
they will issue a protective order. 93 Thus, the party seeking such an
order has the burden of making a substantial showing. Where the
ground for issuance of the order is commercial confidentiality, the party
seeking protection must often provide many details about the operation
of the industry involved. Against that broad factual background, the
party seeking protection must convince the court that the particular information sought is sensitive. This effort can require an elaborate explanation of how others schooled in the area can use seemingly innocuous
data to derive insights into the producing party's manner of operation.
This process invariably discloses a fair amount of sensitive information,
thereby highlighting the potential for abuse and providing the party
seeking discovery with a roadmap for using the confidential information. More significantly, this educational process is difficult and timeconsuming for the court. In some cases the court must review each document to decide, in light of its hard-won understanding of the industry,
whether protection is appropriate.
Busy federal courts have little time for such undertakings. 94 The
91 Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1979); accord
Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 254, 654 P.2d 673, 689 (1982), cert. granted,
52 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1721). ("Parties . . .will be even more reluctant if they are not assured that the information which they give will be used only for the
legitimate purposes of litigation. Many will be tempted to withhold information and even to
shade the truth, where otherwise they would not do so.").
92 Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900
(1964).
93 See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2035, at 265 (1970) (citing cases).
94 Indeed, concern about resolving discovery disputes is not limited to the federal courts;
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complex cases in which protective orders are the norm already occupy a
disproportionate share of courts' time. 95 The prospect of increasing that
burden is not a happy one. One court, confronted with a request to
declassify documents requiring individualized scrutiny of documents
designated confidential, simply refused: "Some person would then be
required to pass upon those justifications [for confidentiality]. I do not
propose to be that person." 96 Judge Becker was equally emphatic in
Zenith, asserting that "the burden of reviewing each document individually in order to determine whether its continuing confidential status is
justified would be almost impossible to meet."' 97 He concluded that a
careful scrutiny in a complex case would make the judge "a veritable
hostage" consigned to "years of adjudication of the confidentiality of
individual documents." 98 The ten-week hearing required in Zenith to
decide questions of admissibility of materials submitted in connection
state courts have confronted similar issues. See, e.g., Proposals to Minimize the Need for Court
Interoention in the Discovey Process, 37 REc. A.B. CrrI N.Y. 535 (1982).
95
See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 1, at 222. Seegenerally W. SCHWARZER, supra note 40, at 116.
96 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 18 Fed. R. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 1251, 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The court expanded on the time-saving purpose of the protective order while denying the motion to vacate the protective order: "The
protective order was issued so that I would be spared the duty of deciding applications for
protective orders during the course of the discovery. Massive quantities of documents have
been furnished by defendants under the umbrella of the protective order and I have been
spared such problems." Id
97 529 F. Supp. at 874.
98 Id at 879 n.18. Consider the description by Professors Hazard and Rice of the
problems involved in evaluating claims of privilege in UnitedStates v.AT&T, where they sat as
special masters: "At the time of our appointment it was estimated that the documents being
withheld on privilege grounds by the litigants and third parties numbered in the tens of
thousands. The sheer volume of materials to be read and evaluated was overwhelming."
Hazard & Rice, supra note 40, at 397. To cope with this burden, they established a fairly
stringent set of procedural requirements for assertions of privilege that reduced the burden on
them and increased the burden on the parties. See id at 401-04. Nevertheless, in a period of
12 months they were called upon to rule on 4,320 claims of privilege. Id at 404. All this
effort was necessary even though the court had entered a protective order that applied to all
material produced by third parties that the authors described as "lolne of the significant steps
taken to expedite the production process." Id at 398; see also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1192 (D.S.C. 1974) (court describes resolution of privilege claims
in antitrust case as "the most arduous task it has ever undertaken in its 26 years of public
service"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,307 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(on motion to compel production of 40,000 allegedly privileged documents, court refused "to
wade through the equivalent of 100 novels to determine the validity of the parties' blanket
claims of privilege" and simply ordered all such documents produced); cf. Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir. 1983) (describing potential burden of line-by-line
review by courts in resolving disputes about application of exemptions to requests under the
Freedom of Information Act). Although these cases are certainly not typical, they offer a
troubling analogy because privilege issues at least involve legal principles that'are more concrete than the standards for granting a protective order. Evaluating the needs of confidentiality would surely have placed much greater burdens on the adjudicators and the parties. See
generally W. SCHWARZER, supra note 40, at § 3-6A to -6B (regarding burden of deciding discovery disputes).
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with the defendants' summary judgment motion substantiates Judge
Becker's assertion. 99
The good cause standard, however, did offer some refuge from
these burdens. Its inherent flexibility afforded substantial maneuvering
room. For example, courts could easily make generalizations about
types of documents, and they have generally presumed that certain categories of information, such as customer lists and detailed financial data,
are entitled to protection.' ° ° Good cause, therefore, provided a workable framework. Although Halkin acknowledges that courts may relax its
stringent standards to some extent in cases involving large numbers of
documents,10 1 its abandonment of the good cause standard will surely
magnify the burden on the courts.
The Halkin approach requires a court, before entering a protective
order, to complete a careful tripartite analysis of: (1) the nature of the
harm posed by dissemination; (2) the particularity of the factual showing that such harm will occur; and (3) the availability of less intrusive
alternatives. 0 2 Moreover, the second leg of this analysis is "constitutionally mandated when the order restricts expression,"'10 3 which would
seem to be true in every case.' 0 4 The court must also make adequate
findings with regard to each leg of the analysis; indeed, the absence of
such findings was the reason for the issuance of the writ of mandamus in
Halkin. Thus, the Halkin approach not only rigidifies the court's task by
constitutionalizing it, but also makes it considerably more onerous by
insisting on particularized attention and detailed findings.
It is unclear whether the courts have, since Halkin, regularly hewed
99 See 529 F. Supp. at 880.
100 See, e.g., Chesa Int'l, Ltd. v. Fashion Assocs., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234, 237 (S.D.N.Y.),
afdmem., 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977) (customer list); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1348 (D. Hawaii 1975) (financial records); Russ Stonier, Inc. v. Deoz Wood Co., 52 F.R.D.
232 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (customer list); Corbett v. Free Press Ass'n, 50 F.R.D. 179 (D. Vt. 1970)
(financial records); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 605 (D.D.C. 1969) (financial
records); American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680 (D.R.I.
1959) (customer list).
101 See 598 F.2d at 196 n.47.
102 Id. at 191-96.
103 Id at 193 (citation omitted).
104
It seems that Judge Bazelon meant to exclude some protective orders by limiting his
constitutional edict to orders that "restrict expression," seeid, but such a limitation appears
unrealistic. It is true that a court can phrase a protective order so that it less clearly addresses
expression. For example, it can simply prohibit misuse (i.e., for business rather than litigation
purposes) of information such as trade secrets rather than forbidding disclosure altogether.
Nonetheless, the norm is to issue protective orders that limit the disclosure of confidential
information. See supra text accompanying note 4. There is a good reason for this. Only by
limiting dissemination can the court actually hope to guard against the prohibited use. Although it is theoretically possible for a court to forbid a person who has learned secrets
through discovery from using them for purposes other than litigation, the policing problems
are insurmountable. Thus, both parties and courts look to containing the information as the
only practical method of protection. Accordingly, it is unlikely that a significant number of
orders do not inhibit expression because free expression is precisely what they forbid.
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its demanding line, but a review of some decisions suggests the kinds of
difficulties that courts adopting the Halkin approach will encounter.
Even before Halkin, the good cause standard was, itself, often extremely
high. One court, for example, refused to issue a protective order covering materials containing information about revenues, sales, and manufacturing data sought from a nonparty on the ground that, although the
information was "highly secret," it was not held "under a pledge of secrecy."10 5 Since Halkin, however, such demands for extraordinary showings have surfaced more frequently. For example, one district court
reasoned that Halkin required it to reject Exxon Corporation's designation of certain documents as confidential because Exxon had merely relied on "vague and conclusory generalizations."'' 0 6 The problem, the
court explained, was that Exxon "does not explicate how each document
will cause concrete harm" and "makes no effort to specify how individual documents will cause flagrant harm to Exxon's economic stature if
released."' 1 7 Thus a page by page showing of "flagrant harm" was held
to be required for a protective order. Another district court denied a
motion for a protective order in a products liability action, even though
the defendant had shown that the Federal Drug Administration treated
the information as a trade secret, that it was costly to produce or duplicate, and that it had not been publicly disclosed. 0 8 The court held that
because the plaintiff was a user of the product rather than a competitor
of the defendant, and because the defendant had not alleged that the
plaintiff would "use the fruits of discovery for other than legitimate legal
proceedings," the defendant had failed to demonstrate competitive injury. 0 9 In view of the argument that the parties may, in the absence of
a protective order, make whatever use they desire of discovered material, and the existence of cases indicating that the parties may simply
decide to market the trade secrets they obtain through discovery, 11o this
court's conclusion is remarkable. Such a conclusion is, however, seemingly consistent with Halkin's constitutional postulate that the party affected must make a particularized showing that the harm will occur.
105 United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This decision was partly
affected by the fact that the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act, 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1976), applied
to this antitrust prosecution by the government, required a finding that the information
would not be subject to a protective order unless it was so confidential that it would justify a
closed trial. For a discussion of that statute see infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text. It
is also noteworthy that the information involved came from nonparty witnesses, rather than
parties.
106 United States v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 250, 252 (D.D.C. 1981).
107 Id at 251 (emphasis in original).
108 Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
109

Id

at 29.

10 See National Polymer Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1981);
cf In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods., 81 F.R.D. 482, 484-85 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(plaintiffs' counsel proposed to sell information obtained to counsel for other plaintiffs suing

on similar claims), afd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981).
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The central point is not that any of these courts erred in denying
protection to the materials before them, but rather that the courts and
litigants expended a great deal of energy on activities that did not advance the resolution of the litigation on the merits. Indeed, it appears
that the courts that slavishly adhere to the Halkin requirements have
made the requisite showing so difficult that it is often virtually impossible to obtain protective orders. Thus, the courts, after expending large
amounts of time reviewing the matter, regularly deny protective order
motions. This trend only increases the likelihood that parties seeking
discovery who would previously have stipulated to protective orders will
refuse, thereby compounding the burden on the courts of resolving matters irrelevant to the merits of the litigation.
D.

Disclosure as an Impediment to Settlements

Far more cases are settled than tried. Commentators and judges
increasingly recognize that facilitating settlements is a legitimate and
desirable goal for courts to pursue.tII The right of access approach imperils settlement efforts in two ways.
First, by undercutting the court's ability to assure a full exchange of
information by entering an umbrella protective order, the stringent view
of protective orders inhibits the untrammeled exchange of information
between the parties. Although there is some question as to whether the
exchange of information actually increases the likelihood of settlements,"12 many judges have concluded that it does.1 3 Attempting to
verify the intuitive and reasonable conclusion of judges that full disclosure aids the settlement process as it does the litigation process is proba111 Thus, the recent amendment to rule 16 explicitly directs that the pretrial hearing
include discussion of "the possibility of settlement." FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 170 (1983). The Advisory Committee notes suggest further that the
court may "urge" the parties to explore private dispute resolution possibilities. Similarly, rule
68, relating to offers ofjudgment, provides an incentive to parties to accept formal settlement
offers by imposing costs on them unless the ultimate judgment is more favorable than the
offer. In August 1983, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference
of the United States proposed amendments to strengthen rule 68 as a device to promote
settlements. See Preliminay Draft ofProposed Amendments, 712 F.2d xci, cxiii (1983). For a general discussion of the role ofjudges in the settlement process, see Tone, The Role oftheJudge in
the Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES 57 (1975).

112 Thus, in recommending amendments to rule 26 in 1970, including addition of subsection 26(c), the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules relied on the field survey of the Project
for Effective Justice of Columbia Law School for the following: "Discovery frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be available to the parties and thereby makes for a
fairer trial or settlement. On the other hand, no positive evidence is found that discovery
promotes settlement." ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules ofCivil ProcedureRelatingto Discovey, 48 F.R.D. 485, 489-90 (1970).
113 See, e.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir.) ("[T]he need for trial frequently disappears once both sides have a full and complete understanding of the facts."), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 54 (1982).
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bly not worthwhile. Nonetheless, as long as there is even a possibility
that those judges are right, it is counterproductive to foreclose attempts
to facilitate settlement by invalidating or undercutting protective
orders.
Second, the Halkin approach reduces or eliminates the possibility
that effective limitations on disclosure can be made a part of a settlement package. A party may desire a settlement in part to avoid a trial
at which confidential information will be disclosed. Such a party is
likely to condition his willingness to settle upon the entry of a court
order prohibiting the disclosure of the terms of the settlement or of information obtained through discovery. Indeed, the customary requirement that the discovering party return materials deemed confidential at
the end of the litigation 1 4 assumes that post-litigation disclosure is forbidden. Such settlements may substantially reduce the burden on the
courts. The Second Circuit, for example, recently affirmed a secrecy
order entered to effect a settlement by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation in a suit against an accounting firm arising out of the failure of Franklin National Bank.1 15 The court reasoned that the order
was necessary to prevent a lengthy, bitterly contested trial,1 16 and therefore rejected a public interest group's request to set aside the order. But
if a court must justify judicial limitations on free expression by detailed
findings, how much weight should be accorded the interest in avoiding
such a trial? Is the waste of judicial resources resulting from disclosure a
harm sufficient to justify the order? Unless the settling parties can assume that protective orders will not be subject to later attack by outsid1 7
ers or adverse litigants, this avenue of settlement may also be blocked.
See supra text accompanying note 48.
115 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982) (per
curiam). The challenge to the order was based on the Freedom of Information Act, not the
constitutional or common law right of access.
114

116

Id

at 231.

117 In this connection, some mention should be made of two popular arguments that
threaten to undermine further the ability of courts to enter confidentiality orders to effect
settlement. First, courts often take a "dated matter" approach to material for which protection is sought. Essentially, courts employing this approach hold that if so much time has
passed that once-confidential material no longer appears highly sensitive, the passage of time
precludes a showing of good cause to justify the issuance of a protective order. Although this
analysis makes sense in the initial determination whether to issue the order, it threatens mischief in the context of a motion to modify such an order because the party seeking disclosure
can then argue that passage of time since production renders continued protection inappropriate. This logic would seem to undermine almost all confidentiality orders entered as part
of a settlement package because a party could certainly assert that the passage of time had
obviated the need for continuing protection of the materials. Thus, courts should apply the
"dated matter" approach only to the initial determination of whether to issue a protective
order ab initio.
Second, some courts point toward the prospect of disclosure at trial as a ground for
limiting protective orders, reasoning that if the information will be disclosed at trial, the
additional harm that results from earlier disclosure is insignificant. But the court cannot be
sure in advance precisely which material will be admissible at trial. More significantly, this
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III
REJECTING THE MYTH OF PUBLIC ACCESS

Many of the most troubling consequences of the public access approach result from the assumption that nonparties have some right to
obtain discovery materials. This attitude is likely not only to foster litigation over protective orders and preclude settlements, but also to sanction lawsuits designed to obtain information rather than judicial relief.
Part I demonstrated that the notion that all discovery takes place in
public contradicts reality. This Part will show that the public access approach is also unsupported by legal authority. Accordingly, courts
should reject the myth of general public access to discovery materials.
In its place, this Part identifies the specific situations that justify nonparty access.
A. The "Public" Nature of Discovery
It is insufficient to demonstrate that discovery is not, in fact, public.
Instead, resolution of the right to access issue requires analysis of recent
decisions expounding a constitutional and common law right of access
to proceedings and judicial records.1 "" Although such an analysis does
not demark the exact contours of these emerging doctrines, it does
demonstrate that there is no persuasive legal support for an unfettered
constitutional or common law right of general public access to civil discovery materials. Accordingly, there is no occasion to jettison reality in
deference to new constitutional constructs.
The uncertain landmark in the area is Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 119 in which the Supreme Court held an order excluding the

public from a criminal trial invalid on first amendment grounds. Although the holding is relatively clear, discerning the rationale behind it
is a difficult task in view of the six separate opinions filed in the decision-none of which commanded the support of more than three Justices. Some of the opinions argued that the Court had recognized a first
amendment right for "the acquisition of newsworthy matter"' 20 or a
"privilege of access to governmental information,"12 1 but the only cerargument disregards the fact that most cases do not go to trial; if the standard is whether
information would be secretly received in evidence at trial, rule 26(c) would be entirely swallowed by another set of standards relating to closing the trial itself.
118 The distinction between the common law and constitutional rights, however much
addressed, is somewhat ambiguous. The common law right is said to antedate the Constitution, whereas the first amendment right is of rather recent vintage. Yet, the latter is based on
historical tradition. To avoid unnecessary complexity, this article will use them
interchangeably.
119 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
120
d at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). Professor Archibald Cox explains Justice Stevens's assertion as "wishful thinking." Cox, Freedom of/he Press, 1983 U. ILL. L. REx'. 3, 19.
121
Id. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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tain principle emerging from the decision is the Court's holding that the
first amendment guarantees the public and, derivatively, the press the
right to attend criminal trials except where compelling reasons require
that the trial be closed.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 122 a 1982 decision in which the
Court held that the public was improperly excluded from a trial of a sex
offense during the testimony of the minor victim, provides useful insight
into RichmondNewspapers. In Globe Newspaper, the trial court ordered the
trial closed pursuant to a Massachusetts statute designed in part to encourage young victims to come forward with evidence of crimes. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute required
that the trial be closed in every sex offense case during the victim's testimony. The court rejected a case-by-case analysis, asserting that a nonmandatory rule could undermine the statute's purpose because
prospective complainants would not be assured the protection of the
23
statute when deciding whether to come forward.'
The Supreme Court, emphasizing the state court's insistence on
mandatory application of the statute, reversed. 124 Speaking through
Justice Brennan, the Court synthesized the essence of Richmond Newspapers as follows:
Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in the
various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together serve to explain why
access to criminaltrials in particular is properly afforded protection by
the First Amendment. First, the criminal trial historically has been
open to the press and general public ...
Second, the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. [It] enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process . . . fosters an appearance of fairness
. . land]
[
permits the public to participate in and serve as a check
upon the judicial process-an essential component in our structure of
25
self-government. 1
Having thus explained the import of Richmond Newspapers, the
Court in Globe Newspaper found that the state had failed to substantiate
its interest in encouraging minor victims to come forward with evidence,
in part because it did not introduce sufficient supporting empirical evidence.126 In a passage particularly significant for civil protective orders,
122

457 U.S. 596 (1982).

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1493, 1502-03, 423
N.E.2d 773, 779-80 (1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 596.
124
The majority opinion was joined by five Justices. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens dissented. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.
125
457 U.S. at 605-06 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
126
See id. at 609-10. The Court also noted that the supposed state interest was contradicted by the fact that the press had access to the transcript of the victim's testimony. Coin123
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Justice Brennan suggested that the interests in promoting full disclosure
probably could not outweigh the constitutional right of access in any
event because "that same interest could be relied on to support an array
of mandatory closure rules designed to encourage victims to come forward."' 27 Consequently, the Court concluded that the state's argument
"proves too much, and runs contrary to the very foundation of the right
of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers: namely, 'that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our
system of justice.' "128 Because the policy underlying protective orders-encouraging full disclosure by persons from whom information is
sought in civil cases-is hardly more important than the societal interest
in having crimes reported to the authorities, this reasoning bodes ill for
the continued position of protective orders vis-a-vis the first amendment
right of public access.
The critical issue, therefore, is whether the same right of access arguments apply to civil proceedings and, if so, whether these arguments
are applicable to pretrial discovery as well as trial proceedings. At least
one Justice believes that Richmond Newspapers applies only to criminal
trials,129 but there are many reasons to doubt this conclusion. Both features of the criminal justice system that the Court emphasized in Globe
Newspaper are characteristic, to a substantial degree, of civil litigation as
well. Civil trials, as Chief Justice Burger noted in his plurality opinion
in Richmond Newspapers, 130 have traditionally been open to the public.
More significantly, many of the societal interests said to support access
to criminal trials are also implicated in civil trials. Although criminal
justice admittedly plays a different and more newsworthy role in society
than civil litigation, which is designed to resolve private disputes, the
integrity of the factfinding process and public respect for the judicial
process are important in the civil context as well. Some courts have
pare Justice Brennan's opinion in chambers in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 103 S. Ct.
3524, 3526 (1983) (Brennan, J., in chambers), where he granted a stay of a state court order
that prohibited disclosure of information about jurors in a criminal case: "I assume, for purposes of argument only, that the State has a compelling interest in keeping personal information about jurors confidential in an appropriate case, either to assure the defendant a fair trial
or to protect the privacy of jurors." (citations omitted).
127 457 U.S. at 610.
128 Id (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573).
129 Concurring in the judgment in Globe Newspaper, Justice O'Connor announced that she
would "interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any
implications outside the context of criminal trials." Id at 611.
130 See 448 U.S. at 567-68 (citing 17th century writers who argued that all courts should
be open for civil as well as criminal trials), 580 n.17 ("[H]istorically both civil and criminal
trials have been presumptively open."); see also id at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (analogizing "miscarriage ofjustice that imprisons an innocent accused" to "mistakes
of fact in civil litigation"). Fora more detailed exposition of the proposition that "the historical analysis [as to rights of access] . . .is equally applicable to civil and criminal cases," see
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979).
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therefore concluded that Richmond Newspapers also establishes a right to
1 31
attend civil trials.
That conclusion does not mean that the Court would find the good
cause standard an inadequate justification for pretrial protective orders.
Indeed, the, actual holding in Globe Newspaper suggests the contrary. In
Globe Newspaper, the Court was most troubled by the automatic exclusion of the public under the Massachusetts court's interpretation of the
state statute. Rejecting any automatic exclusion policy, the Court held
that exclusion must be based upon an examination of the particular circumstances of the case in question.1 32 That kind of individualized analysis is, of course, precisely what the rule 26(c) good cause standard is
designed to promote. 133 Thus, the holding of Globe Newspaper appears to
authorize a procedure similar to that employed for contested protective
orders.
The interests the Court has cited as justifying public access to criminal trials also appear inapplicable to pretrial discovery in a civil case.
Even in the criminal context, the Court permits limitations on public
access to anything more than proceedings in open court during trial. In
Niron v. Warner Communications, 134 for example, the Court upheld Judge
Sirica's refusal to allow various recording companies access to a number
of Watergate tapes even though the government had introduced the
tapes into evidence and played them during the criminal trial of John
Mitchell and a variety of former White House officials. The Court concluded that the first amendment does not provide a right of access to
evidence and held that courts can limit the common law right of access
if it threatens to become a "vehicle for improper purposes."' 3 5 Among
131 See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 800-01 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 896 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Fenner & Koley,
Access to JudicialProceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 415, 430 (1981); Note, The FirstAmendment Right of Access to Government-HeldInformation: A
Re-Evaluation After Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 292, 328
(1982); Recent Development, The Public andPress Have a Right of Access to Criminal TrialsAbsent
an Overriding Interest Articulatedin Findings, 26 VILL. L. REv. 183, 202 (1980).
The Court has already faced one abortive attempt to obtain a ruling that Richmond Newspapers requires public access to pretrial proceedings in civil cases. In Cox Enters., Inc. v.
Vascocu, No. C-719 (Tex. Sept. 24, 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982), the trial court in a
civil case initially closed a pretrial hearing to avoid prejudicial publicity. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas at 3, Cox Enters., Inc. v. Vascocu, No. 811154 (1982). The trial court thereafter reopened the proceedings, apparently mooting the
issue. See Brief in Opposition at 3-4, Cox Enters., Inc. v. Vascocu, No. 81-1154 (1982).
132
See 457 U.S. at 608 & n.20.
133
See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
134
435 U.S. 589 (1978).
135
Id. at 598. The Court cited a number of state court decisions, described infia note
136, that it characterized as legitimately denying access to public records that might be
" 'used to gratify private spite,' " "serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption" or "as sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing." 435 U.S. at 598. Although the contours of this power to limit access are unclear, the
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the examples of such limitations the Court cited with apparent approval
was a 1917 state court decision sealing a deposition and enjoining disclosure of the contents.1 36 Thus, one may infer that the Court implicitly
authorized the sealing of discovery materials, as well as restraints on the
disclosure of discovered information, in certain circumstances.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,137 a 1979 decision, the Court upheld
the closing of a pretrial suppression hearing in a criminal case to protect
litany of examples the Court provided is certainly informative by way of analogy for interpretation ofrule 26(c). If there is an accepted history that would allow limitations on access even
to public records in such circumstances, it would seem that the power to restrict access to
discovery materials must be equally broad.
136 King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 P. 730 (1917). The court there entered its order after
the deposition was filed as part of a stipulated judgment. Id at 280, 168 P. at 731. The other
cases cited by the Court, 435 U.S. at 498, were: C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974) (court,
noting that "civil litigation is not infrequently merely a means to resolve private disputes
....
[but that] [s]uch cases or portions of such cases may or may not be of legitimate and
reasonable public interest," reversed trial court's decision allowing newspaper to obtain access
to sealed file in divorce case after completion of closed trial); Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 158, 61 N.E.2d 5, 6 (1945) (court, noting that under Massachusetts
law "the right to report proceedings in the courts does not extend to reporting accusations
contained in papers filed by a party and not yet brought before a judge or magistrate for
official action," sustained libel action for newspaper report of accusations contained in pleadings); Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1, 4, 48 N.W. 201, 202 (1891) (court, in denying application by newspaper for access to pleadings in civil cases sealed by court order, distinguished
between reports relating to final judgments and pretrial matters, emphasizing that "[t]hese
suits involve private dealings between private parties"); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72
Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888) (libel claim against newspaper for erroneous report concerning bastardy proceeding upheld); Flexmir, Inc. v. Herman, 40 A.2d 799, 800 (N.J. Ch. 1945)
(court removed sensitive matter from court file in action to enjoin misuse of secret processes);
Munzer v. Blaisdell, 268 A.D. 9, 48 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1944) (court indicating that complaint
reciting libelous assertions could be sealed); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893) (reporter denied access to record in divorce case).
Finally, in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884), the Massachusetts court refused to
allow a newspaper sued for libel for reporting charges made against the plaintiff in a petition
filed in court to rely on the privilege of reporting judicial proceedings. Speaking through
Justice Holmes, it emphasized the distinction between the reporting of trial and pretrial
matters:
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye,
not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every
citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in
which a public duty is performed.
If these are not the only grounds upon which fair reports of judicial
proceedings are privileged, all will agree that they are not the least important
ones. And it is clear that they have no application whatever to the contents of
a preliminary written statement of a claim or charge. These do not constitute
a proceeding in open court. Knowledge of them throws no light upon the
administration ofjustice.
Id at 394.
In sum, the cases cited by the Court in Arixon v. Warner Communications confirm the general
understanding set forth in Part I that pretrial proceedings are analytically distinct from actual trial proceedings for purposes of public disclosure and that material disclosed in private
litigation, even if filed in court, is not presumptively public.
:37 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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the defendant's interest in a fair trial. The central argument for access
was based on the sixth amendment right to a public trial in criminal
cases, and the Court rejected the sixth amendment argument while reserving ruling on first amendment issues.'13 The case nevertheless is important in evaluating access to pretrial discovery in civil cases. The
Court reasoned that "our adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon the proposition that the public interest is fully protected by
the participants in the litigation."'' 39 With respect to the common law
right of access, the Court emphasized that "pretrial proceedings . . .
were never characterized by the same degree of openness as were actual
trials."' 40 Even with respect to criminal trials, then, the Court has upheld limitations on access to evidence introduced at trial and found even
highly important pretrial proceedings involving critical judicial decisions 1 4 1 subject to lesser rights of access than the actual trial itself.
In addressing another aspect of the criminal justice system, the
Court has more readily denied a public right of access. Three times
recently it has held that the press and public have no first amendment
142
right of access to prisons to observe or report on conditions there.
138
The court held that even if such a right exists, the trial judge-who acted under such
an assumption-had made findings sufficient to justify closure. See Id. at 392-93. In United
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1344-45 (D.C. 1981), cerl. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982), the
court held that Richmond Newspapers recognized a first amendment right to attend pretrial
hearings in court in criminal cases; see also Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705
F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing trial court order sealing all pretrial documents in
widely publicized narcotics prosecution); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th
Cir. 1982) (finding district court erred in closing pretrial suppression hearing but that error
did not merit mandamus); United States v. Dorfman, 550 F. Supp. 877, 884-86 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (public has right to review documents sealed during pretrial suppression hearing); State
v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 647-51 (N.J. 1983) (public has right of access to bail hearing and to
probable cause hearing).
139 443 U.S. at 384.
140
Id at 387-88. Chief Justice Burger was even more definite on the question of discovery in his concurring opinion:
[Djuring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that
a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly private
to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a "trial" until
and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evidence.
Id at 396 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
141
As Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion, "[i]n our criminal justice system as
it has developed, suppression hearings often are as important as the trial which may follow
• . . In view of the special significance of the suppression hearing, the public's interest in this
proceeding often is comparable to its interest in the trial itself." Id at 397 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring). It is difficult to rebut this argument if one emphasizes the importance of observing the judiciary at work. The situation is, however, vastly different with pretrial civil discovery. See infra text accompanying notes 169-70.
142
In each case the principal argument advanced in support of the claimed right of
access was that the first amendment gave the press, as a representative of the public, a right to
gather information in public possession in order to facilitate reporting on governmental activities to the public. In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (4-3 decision), a broadcasting station claimed the right to bring cameras into a county jail. The Court held that the
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Even though prisons are also a part of the criminal justice system, the
Court concluded that such facilities, unlike courtrooms, have not traditionally been open to the public.' 43 As in Richmond Newspapers, these
cases fragmented the Court; none offered a majority opinion to which
five Justices subscribed, and in each there was a vigorous dissent. The
dissents, however, provide no grounds for implying a constitutional right
of public access to civil pretrial discovery. Instead, they argued that
prisons are public institutions, giving the public a legitimate interest in
being informed about what goes on inside them, 144 particularly when
the information sought is not confidential. 4 5 More significantly, these
dissents emphasized the role prisons play in the judicial system as the
ultimate destination of many defendants after criminal trials to which
the public does have a right of access.' 46 Despite these interests, emanating in part from the connection between prisons and criminal trials, the
Court in each instance rejected the claim that the first amendment
created a public right of access. Although some may question the reapress, similar to the rest of the public, had no such right. In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843 (1974), the Court upheld the refusal of federal prison officials, pursuant to the
Policy Statement of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, to grant the media interviews with specified prisoners. In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the Court upheld a similar provision
in the regulations of the California Department of Corrections.
143 See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974). In RichmondNewspapers, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion distinguished these cases on the ground that
"they were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not 'open' or public
places." 448 U.S. at 576 n.11; cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (exclusion of civilian
from military base); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (affirming convictions of persons
who staged demonstration in nonpublic part of jail).
144 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "[s]ociety has a special interest in ensuring that unconvicted citizens are
treated in accord with their status" and emphasizing "the special importance of allowing a
democratic community access to knowledge about how its servants were treating some of its
members"); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 861 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(observing that because federal prisons are public institutions, their internal administration,
"the effectiveness of their rehabilitative programs, the conditions of confinement that they
maintain, and the experiences of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters of legitimate societal interest and concern"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("Prisons, like all other public institutions, are ultimately the responsibility of the
populace ....
The public's interest in being informed about prisons is thus paramount.").
145 See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 861 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Respondents do not assert a right to force disclosure of confidential information ....
").
146 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted):
The reasons which militate in favor of providing special protection to the
flow of information to the public about prisons relate to the unique function
they perform in a democratic society. Not only are they public institutions,
financed with public funds and administered by public servants, they are an
integral component of the criminal justice system . . . . It is important not
only that the trial itself be fair, but also that the community at large have
confidence in the integrity of the proceeding. That public interest survives
the judgment of conviction and appropriately carries over to an interest in
how the convicted person is treated during his period of punishment and
hoped-for rehabilitation.
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soning of these cases, 14 7 they hardly portend the unveiling of a constitutional right of access to civil discovery.
The Court has shown no inclination to take a broader view of first
amendment or common law rights of access in civil cases. To the contrary, it has raised no objections to the protective orders it has encountered in the civil litigation arena. In one civil case, the Court did not
object to a restrictive protective order that may even have been significant to the Court's decision not to grant mandamus to overturn the discovery ruling at issue. 148 Even Justices Douglas and Brennan, two of the
most energetic advocates of first amendment freedoms, have relied on
the availability of protective orders as a basis for refusing to stay lower
court orders compelling discovery.1 49 Thus, Supreme Court holdings do
147 Professor Van Alstyne, for example, has argued that Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1 (1978), is based on "rather uncompelling administrative objections to press access."
Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old
Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 2 (1980).
148 Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). Plaintiff state prisoners challenged the length of detention by the California Adult Authority and sought production of
various materials about members and employees of the Adult Authority. Although the defendants claimed that the materials were confidential, the district court ordered the materials
produced subject to a protective order that limited access to counsel of record for the plaintiffs. Id at 398. The Ninth Circuit refused to overturn the district court's ruling on petition
by defendants for a writ of mandamus. Even though the plaintiffs withdrew their request for
the materials in question before the Supreme Court issued its decision, id at 401 n.5, the
Court nonetheless proceeded with the case and affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling. The
Court's reasoning focused on the possibility that a lower court could conduct an in camera
review of the documents. It felt that such a procedure would avoid unneeded disclosure of
the documents. See id at 405-06. One suspects that it would indeed have surprised the Court
to suggest that the protective order did not afford protection even the defendants deemed
inadequate; in all likelihood, the Court would have more favorably considered the petition
under those circumstances.
The possibility that the protective order in Kerr would be invalid under Halkin is not
fanciful, however. In Phillips v. District of Columbia, No. 80-2171, slip op. (D.C. Cir.Jan. 11,
1983), the court invalidated a protective order under similar circumstances. The plaintiffs in
Phillips were also prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement. They objected to
discovery sought by the defendant corrections officials on the ground that the officers at the
institution might learn of the information thereby exposing them to the risk of reprisal. Id at
3-4. The trial court ordered responses to the discovery but issued a protective order limiting
the availability of the information to counsel. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiffs,
the court held that the order was impermissible under Halkin because it interfered with communication between the defendants and their attorneys. The court noted that an order forbidding disclosure of the information to guards or inmates would have sufficed. Id at 10.
149 In Reproductive Servs., Inc. v. Walker, 439 U.S. 1307, 1309 (1978) (Brennan, J., in
chambers), Justice Brennan dissolved a stay of discovery seeking the identity of other abortion
patients in a malpractice action "on express condition that the parties agree to a protective
order ensuring the privacy of patients at applicant's clinics." Similarly, in Chamber of Commerce v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 423 U.S. 1309, 1312 (1975) (Douglas, J., in chambers), Justice
Douglas denied an application for a stay of an order compelling production of certain documents in part because a protective order had been entered: "Applicant will not suffer irreparable injury from disclosure of the documents because the District Court has entered a
protective order permitting only attorneys for the Legal Aid Society to examine the assertedly
privileged documents."
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not directly support employing the first amendment as an impediment
to the entry of protective orders in civil discovery. To the contrary, the
only Supreme Court decision directly considering the impact of the first
amendment on discovery in a civil case held that, far from requiring
access, the first amendment prohibited compelled disclosure of the
membership lists of the NAACP because that would chill freedom of
0
association. 15
Although dicta in the Supreme Court's first amendment right of
public access cases thus provide some ammunition to those seeking public access to pretrial discovery in civil cases, the Court's actual decisions
belie that result. The Court has rested its decisions upholding the right
of access to criminal trials on the two prongs: the tradition of public
access and the value of access as a means of heightening public respect
for the judicial process and permitting public scrutiny of judicial performance. An analysis of these two prongs confirms that these cases do
not apply to civil discovery.
First, as demonstrated in Part I, there simply is no tradition of public access to discovery; in reality, the practice is to the contrary. Legal
authority provides little guidance and in no way undercuts the reality of
privacy. Two of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are pertinent.
Rule 43(a) provides that, except in extraordinary circumstances, "[i]n
all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open
court."' 5 1 This rule was a reaction to the closing of depositions in equity practice, where the parties frequently substituted depositions for the
trial testimony of the witness.15 2 The provisions of rule 43(a) obviously
render the question of a constitutional right to attend civil trial in federal court academic, but other trial related proceedings, such as discus1 53
sions of the law between court and counsel, may still be private.
Certainly, rule 43(a) implies nothing about pretrial discovery. Although
150

In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the lower court ordered the NAACP to

produce various records, including membership lists, in connection with a proceeding filed by
the Alabama Attorney General that asserted that some NAACP-sponsored activities had violated Alabama law. Id at 453. When it refused to produce the membership lists, the court
held the NAACP in contempt. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that compelled
disclosure of membership lists would violate the members' first amendment freedom of association. For a more recent decision holding that civil discovery violates the first amendment,
see Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 574 P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978) (order
compelling disclosure of plaintiff's private associational affiliations and activities infringed on
his first amendment rights). For a discussion of the use of protective orders to guard against
invasion of protected rights of association, see Steinmann, Privacy of Association: A Burgeoning
Privilege in Civil Discovery, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 429-34 (1982).
151
FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). Similar provisions existed in federal law before the promulgation of the Federal Rules. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88.
152 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2407 (1971).
153 Cf United States ex rel Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 1969) (conferences between court and counsel outside presence of jury); People v. Teitlebaum, 163 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 206-07, 329 P.2d 157, 171-72 (1958) (same), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 206 (1959).
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some courts rejecting protective order arguments have cited rule 43(a) as
indicative of the public nature of discovery, 154 the rule is actually nothing more than a statement of the public nature of the trial itself.
More significantly with respect to pretrial discovery, rule 77(b) provides that, while trials on the merits shall be in open court, "[a]ll other
acts or proceedings may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers,
without the attendance of the clerk or other court officials and at any
place either within or without the district." 155 As to any judicial act
other than a trial on the merits, then, the judge may exclude the public
and proceed in chambers. The judge may make any interlocutory order, based on such nonpublic proceedings, in his chambers as well.1 5 6 In
Zenith, for example, Judge Becker closed part of a preliminary eviden1 57
tiary hearing and excluded a spectator from another pretrial hearing.
More generally, courts conduct critical pretrial hearings by telephone
with increasing frequency. 58 Such procedures obviously foreclose public access. If the rules authorize the court to exclude the public from
pretrial hearings that result in judicial action, one cannot seriously contend that there is a tradition of public access to deposition proceedings
in lawyers' offices that involve neither public notice nor judicial
involvement.
The Publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913,159 the only authority dealing directly with access to deposition proceedings, confirms this
154 See, e.g., Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 900 (1966); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa.

1969).
155
156

FED. R. CIv. P. 77(b).

See 7J. MOORE &J.

LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 77.03 (2d ed. 1972); 12
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 3082 (1973).
157
529 F. Supp. at 879 & n. 19; see also Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch.,
Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (closing portion of hearing on motion for preliminary
injunction); ef Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (1 th Cir. 1983) (ordering press access to
pretrial hearings in civil rights action challenging overcrowding in prison).
158
For a description of Judge Becker's use of telephonic pretrial hearings in the Zenith
case, which he labeled "[t]he principal vehicle for getting this case organized for trial," see
Becker, Organizationfor Trial in Antitrust Cases, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 239, 241 (1982). Courts
may use telephone conferences to resolve a variety of critical pretrial matters. See, e.g., Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 275 (3d Cir.) (noting that trial court had
decided motion to enjoin shareholder vote during telephone conference), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
874 (1972). Consistent with this trend, rule 16 now provides that a judge may schedule discovery after telephone consultation with the parties. See FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprintedin 97 F.R.D. 165, 168 (1983).
159
Act of March 3, 1913, ch. 114, 37 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1982)). For
another example of a special rule designed to enhance the government's ability to enforce
federal regulatory laws, see § 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat.
881, 900 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982)), which provides that the SEC
may share information in its possession with the Attorney General. Some courts have held
that this provision precludes entry of a rule 26(c) protective order forbidding such transmittal
of information to the Attorney General. See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368,
1384-87 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc),cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980); SEC v. Rubinstein, 95 F.R.D.
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impression. This little-known statute provides that depositions in antitrust suits brought by the United States "shall be open to the public as
freely as are trials in open court." A review of the origin and history of
the Act undercuts the argument that there is a traditional right of public access to depositions. The statute was prompted by a 1912 district
court decision granting the defendant's motion to exclude outsiders from
a deposition on the ground that "by common understanding of the bar
and bench the taking of depositions is a private and not a public proceeding." 160 The Attorney General proposed the statute in response to
that decision. The bill passed after vigorous debate.1 6 t At that time,
however, depositions were permitted only in unusual circumstances as a
substitute for live testimony at trial. The House Report in support of
162
the bill explained that "the master is, in effect, a travelling court."
This practice prompted rule 43(a)'s requirement that testimony at trial
be public; the statute was not designed to ensure public access to genuine discovery depositions, which were not generally available in 1913.163
More significantly, the proponents of the bill acknowledged that the
1912 district court decision was within the court's power and did not
claim that the court had erred in its characterization of the "common
164
understanding of the bar and bench" that depositions are private.
Not surprisingly, courts have rarely invoked the statute since 1913.
It applies only in antitrust proceedings when the government is the
160 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 198 F. 870, 874 (D. Mass. 1913). For a more
recent expression of this view see State v. Dolen, 390 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(court denied access to defendant to deposition of complaining witness in criminal case, noting that "[tihe scope of the 'trial' has not been extended to discovery depositions as they are
not true judicial proceedings") (footnote omitted); Oclala Star Banner Corp. v. Sturgis, 388
So. 2d 1367, 1371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1980) ("The taking of a deposition itself can hardly be
categorized as a 'judicial proceeding' for the simple reason that no judge is present, and no
rulings or adjudications of any sort are made by judicial authority.").
161 Some representatives made statements urging the House to permit access in all cases.
See 49 CONG. REc. 2511 (1913) (remarks of Rep. Mann) ("I would like to encourage the
Supreme Court to make rules all along the line of procedure and provide a rule that would
not only prevent depositions under the trust law being secret, but prevent the taking of any
depositions in secret.") Others opposed any mandatory openness. See id. at 4622 (remarks of
Rep. Kahn) ("The consequence will be that a shrewd attorney can worm out trade secrets,
can worm out secret processes of manufacture from a willing or indifferent witness ....
")
The debate became rather excited. See id at 4626 (remarks of Rep. Mann) ("There can be no
valid objection to the passage of this bill [applause] except by some one who fears he will be
injured by it, not because he ought not to be injured, but because he hopes to derive some
benefit from sneaking in the dark. [Applause] [Cries of 'Vote!'].") Ultimately the bill passed
as requested by the Attorney General.
162 H.R. REP. No. 1356, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. I (1913); see also 49 CONG. REc. 2511 (1913)
(remarks of Rep. Norris) ("Almost universally in these cases practically all of the evidence is
taken by the master and taken at various places.').
163 See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.1 (2d ed. 1977).
164 See 49 CONG. REC. 4621 (1913) (remarks of Rep. Norris) ("There is no doubt from the
reading of the briefs, and from the opinion of the court, that the court had the right under the
law to decide in its discretion as it did. It was not error.").
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plaintiff, 165 and only to depositions.' 66 Even where the statute does apply, courts have held that it permits an order closing depositions involving allegedly confidential matter, 67 and allows protective orders sealing
the record of government antitrust actions.' 6 Far from substantiating
the traditional openness of pretrial civil discovery, the history and application of the statute prove the reverse.
Second, the Court also has stressed access as a means of heightening
public respect for the judicial process and permitting public scrutiny of
judicial performance. This concern has little application in the pretrial
discovery context. Indeed, one objection to allowing public access to
pretrial discovery is that in most cases no judge is present to rule on the
propriety of the inquiry being pursued.169 Instead, the interrogator is
allowed to range far afield; some courts even have held that an attorney
may be sanctioned for trying to stop inquiry into irrelevant areas by
instructing the witness not to answer. 170 A person observing a deposition would garner only minimal insight into judicial decisionmaking.
Indeed, allowing public access might undermine public respect for the
process. There is thus no persuasive argument that this prong of the
Supreme Court's analysis justifies granting the public access to pretrial
discovery.
Upon close analysis, then, the evolving constitutional and common
law doctrines of right of access to certain judicial proceedings simply do
not and should not apply to pretrial discovery in civil cases. As Justice
Stewart observed in a 1974 speech: "The Constitution itself is neither a
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act."''
There is no
165 See D'Ippolito v. American Oil Co., 272 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
166 See United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 820 (1969). But cf Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964)
("While this statute does not expressly apply to the acquisition of information by means of
interrogatories or subpoenas duces tecum, the policy behind the enactment is equally applicable to these forms of discovery."), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1965).
167 See United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In such cases, the court
makes a later determination of whether to release the transcript to the public.
168 See United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 820 (1969). Some district courts have exercised their discretionary authority by issuing
protective orders to seal some or all of the record in such actions. See United States v. American Optical Co., 39 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1966); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F.
Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal dimirsed, 371 U.S. 207 (1962).
169 See, e.g., In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[A] judiciallypowered process compelling information that has not yet passed through the adversaryjudicial filter for testing admissibility does not create communications that deserve full [first
amendment] protection."); cf. 49 CONG. REC. 4622 (1913) (remarks of Rep. Kahn)
("[A]though the attorney upon the other side may make an objection against any particular
question . . . still the witness is bound to answer.").

170

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
Stewart, Or Of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975), quoted in Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); see also Krause v. Rhodes, 535 F. Supp. 338, 348 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) ("The policy of 'open file' discovery was not intended to serve as a vehicle to
enlarge the public domain, laudable though that goal is. To permit the discovery process to
'71
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reason for perpetuating the myth that pretrial discovery is public. To
the extent that any decision concerning the availability of a protective
order depends upon that myth, it is flawed.
B.

Situations Warranting Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials

Although no basis exists for unrestrained public access to discovery
materials, there are situations that justify nonparty access, and sometimes even general public access. Specifically, such access may be justified when litigants seek to obtain evidence relevant to other litigation,
when a court bases pretrial decisions on discovery materials, and, in certain extraordinary cases, when there is a strong public interest in the
alleged governmental misconduct that is the subject of the suit. Despite
their broad language, almost all cases that authorize nonparty access to
materials produced under protective orders fall into one of these categories. That the categories can be narrowly drawn, and that cases falling
within these categories do not automatically warrant disclosure, confirm
that unrestrained public access is actually a myth.
1. Use in Other Litigation
By far the most important justification for granting nonparties access to discovery information is their need to use the information in
other litigation. The issue generally arises when a nonparty asks the
court that entered a protective order 172 to modify the order to permit
disclosure to him. Under these circumstances, modification furthers,
rather than undermines, the policies underlying rule 1. The Supreme
Court recognized the propriety of granting access to material covered by
a protective order for use in other litigation in 1915 in Ex parte Uppercu. 173 The petitioner in Upperca claimed a right of access to depositions sealed as part of the settlement decree in an earlier case, intending
to use them to defend himself in a related action. The Court, speaking
through Justice Holmes, agreed: "So long as the object physically exists,
anyone needing it as evidence at a trial has a right to call for it . . .
however proper and effective the sealing may have been as against the
public at large."' 174 The wisdom of this approach is confirmed by the
serve that extraneous purpose would not encourage its acceptance or improve the 'functioning of the discovery process.' "),afd,671 F.2d 212 (6th Cir.),cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 54 (1982).
172 Generally, the nonparty must obtain a modification of the order from the court that
entered the order, rather than seeking to have another court order disclosure of the information. See United States v. ARA Servs., Inc., 1978-2 Trade Gas. (CCH) 62,250 (E.D. Mo.
1978) (refusing to order production of all materials covered by protective order entered by
another court); cf Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Shops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979) (requiring
that application for access to grand jury transcripts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) be passed on by court that impaneled grand jury and court in which collateral civil
action pending).
173 239 U.S. 435 (1915).
174

Id

at 440.
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large number of cases granting nonparties access to discovery material
pertinent to their litigation.175 Indeed, in some products liability cases
plaintiffs' attorneys have formed attorneys' information exchange
groups;176 at least one court has approved the sale of such information to
other plaintiffs, albeit only under court supervision. 77 The Manualfor
175 See Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex. 1980) ("[N]othing
[is] inherently culpable about sharing information obtained through discovery."); Johnson
Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973); Williams v. Johnson & Johnson,
50 F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("no merit to the ... contention that the fruits of discovery
in one case are to be used in that case only"); see also C & C Prods., Inc. v. Messick, 700 F.2d
635 (11 th Cir. 1983); Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 900 (1965); Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579 (D. Colo. 1982); Carter-Wallace,
Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 92 F.R.D. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Hooker
Chems. & Plastic Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421 (W.D.N.Y. 1981). But cf Short v. Western Elec. Co.,
36 FED. R. SERV. 2d (Callaghan) 132 (D.N.J. 1982) (court denies request by newspaper to
unseal deposition); Govatos v. Weis Sees., Inc. [1982 Decisions Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,785 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1982) (summarizing opinion) (compelled disclosure
denied where party seeking disclosure had earlier been offered opportunity to acquire information but had never attempted to reach agreement to share expert's reports before protective order was entered); Pensfield v. Venuti, 93 F.R.D. 364 (D. Conn. 1981) (state criminal
records erasure statute does not insulate information against discovery in civil case). In In re
GAF Corp., No. 83-3020 (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 1983), the court of appeals directed that GAF,
which was challenging the proxy materials sent out by insurgent Samuel Heyman, was entitled to access to materials under seal in connection with a Connecticut lawsuit between Mr.
Heyman and his sister. The district court subsequently held that the withheld information
was material and that Heyman would have to resolicit. See Litigation Undisclosed,Resolicitation
Orderedby Court in GAF Proxy Battle, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 26, at 1260 (July 1,
1983) (reporting GAF decision).
176 See Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579 (D. Colo. 1982);see also Kuiper v. District
Court, 632 P.2d 694, 696 (Mont. 1981) (documents from earlier unrelated products liability
case were "widely disseminated'). Some plaintiffs' lawyers argue that in toxic tort cases
plaintiffs should resist provisions in settlements that require confidentiality for information
produced through discovery. See Lempert, Seeds of Technolog Sprout into Complex Litigation,
Legal Times, June 13, 1983, at 16, col. 1, at 30, col. 3. Moreover, plaintiffs' lawyers in these
cases are beginning to organize before the litigation begins. See Dioxin Task Force Formin5
Massive Litgation Predicted, Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1983, at 3, col. 2 (reporting that "task force" of
plaintiffs' lawyers planned to gather at annual meeting of Association of American Trial
Lawyers to share information and coordinate litigation). Such activity is not new. See Rheingold, The MER/29 Stog-An Instance of Successful Mass DisasterLitzgation, 56 CALIF. L. REv.
116, 122 (1968) (describing meeting of plaintiffs' lawyers at ATLA meeting in 1963 to discuss
coordinated strategy in products liability cases involving anti-cholesterol prescription drug
MER/29).
177 In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Mich.
1979), af'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981). It is perilous, however, to sell such information
without court approval. Thus, in Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., No. 80-119 (N.D.
Iowa, June 29, 1982), the court held counsel for the plaintiff in a products liability action in
contempt and ordered him to pay the defendant $10,000. The plaintiff had won a $300,000
judgment for Toxic Shock Syndrome (TSS) which was on appeal. During this period, plaintiff's attorney Riley found selling the trial transcript to be an effective way to raise money.
The district court found as follows in holding him in contempt:
Shortly after judgment Riley began soliciting orders from plaintiffs' lawyers in other TSS cases and sold them packets containing a transcript of the
trial and all briefs, defendants' answers to interrogatories and exhibits marked
by plaintiff in the final pre-trial conference order, including all exhibits covered by the protective order. . . .The original price was $2,000.00 for both

19831

PROTECTIVE ORDERS

Complex Litigation also endorses a flexible approach, citing the sharing of
discovery, in appropriate circumstances, to avoid duplicative efforts. 178
The Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation has even denied the transfer of related litigation on the assumption that information-sharing will
79
occur without transfer.1
The popularity of such sharing does not mean that courts should
automatically grant nonparty access. Indeed, one court held that the
fact the plaintiff's counsel said she would share information, standing
alone, provided good cause for entry of a protective order. 180 Although
sharing discovery information increases efficiency, it also increases the
risk that parties fearing repeated claims may fight discovery more vigorously. More generally, a rule of automatic access could undermine confidence in protective orders and result in many of the undesirable
consequences described in Part II.
To date the courts have not developed a consistent accommodation
of these interests. Some have suggested that when a party has relied on
a protective order, the court should modify it to grant access to others
only in exceptional circumstances,' 81 but that at least one of the courts
that initially adopted this approach has since repudiated it.182 More
workable guidelines exist. First, in order to obtain access to materials
produced under a protective order in litigation number one, the party
involved in litigation number two should demonstrate that he would
have the right to obtain them in the second action. 8 3 Otherwise one
packages but was later reduced to $450.00 for the first package and $750.00
for the transcript. The proceeds from the sale of both packages amounting to
$67,618.10 have been used for plaintiff's benefit to reduce the cost of this
litigation.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., No. 80-119,
at 3 (N.D. Iowa June 23, 1983) (on file with Cornell Law Review).
178 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. I, § 3.11, pt. II, § 3.11 (5th ed. 1982).
179 See In re Chiropractic Antitrust Litig., 483 F. Supp. 811, 813 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980).
When the district court in which the earlier action was pending refused to modify its protective order, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, putting the burden on the parties
opposing modification to establish that the materials sought would be immune to discovery in
the later action. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 1980).
180 Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,865 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
181 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982);
AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); cf Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949, 954-55 (8th Cir.) (granting writ of mandamus to
overturn trial court's decision modifying protective order where there had been no "showing
that intervening circumstances had in any way obviated the potential prejudice to [plaintiff]"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d
291, 297 (2d Cir. 1979) (Medina, J., concurring) (arguing that an agreement not to disclose
discovery information "should be honored without doing any balancing as to the benefits to
be derived from disregarding it").
182 In Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1980), the court
rejected the "exceptional considerations" language it had endorsed in AT&T v. Grady, 594
F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979), calling that an "unfortunate choice
of words."
183 This consideration was apparently a critical consideration in Wilk v. American Medi-
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risks subverting the substantive policies justifying nondisclosure in litigation number two.' 84 But if the party to litigation number two has a
right to obtain such materials in that case, denying him access simply
increases his expense. Second, a court should ordinarily deny nonparty
access if all the parties to litigation number one oppose it, even though it
may increase the nonparty's expenses. Finally, a court should set aside
confidentiality orders entered in connection with settlements only in extraordinary circumstances. This is a form of party autonomy that is
critical to the reliability of such orders; in most situations they should
not be disturbed. Exparte Uppercu presented such extraordinary circumstances. Rather than show that there was a generalized overlap between
the lawsuits, the petitioner alleged that specified testimony during the
first case by the plaintiff in the second action directly contradicted his
position in the second action.' 85 Such a showing will be rare.
Some courts have erected special barriers to access where the nonparty seeking information is the government, although the public interest in access may well be stronger in such cases. In the leading case,
Judge Marvin Frankel stressed the manifold investigative powers of the
government: "The government as investigator has awesome powers, not
lightly to be enhanced or supplemented by implication."' t8 6 Other
courts have agreed.' 8 7 Although the government is in a stronger investigative position than are products liability plaintiffs,' 8 8 the argument
cal Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1980), where the court suggested that it would make modification almost mandatory, denying modification only where it would "tangibly prejudice
substantial rights of the party opposing modification." Id at 1299.
184
Use of discovery material from litigation number one in litigation number two can
also threaten to subvert the substantive interests involved in litigation number one. In Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1961), the plaintiff initially sued several former
employees in federal court alleging theft of trade secrets. The district court allowed the plaintiff to complete its discovery before responding to all but one of the defendants' interrogatories, subject to a protective order limiting the plaintiff's use of information derived from
discovery to the litigation between the parties. Upon completing that discovery, the plaintiff
filed an action in state court against its former employees and a nondiverse defendant and
requested a preliminary injunction against the defendants' activities. The federal court then
enjoined the plaintiff from using the fruits of federal discovery in the state court proceeding.
Finding that the injunction was necessary to protect the federal scheduling order giving plaintiff priority in discovery from abuse, the Second Circuit affirmed. See id at 248-49.
185 See 239 U.S. 435, 438-40 (1915).
186
GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Corp., 415 F. Supp. 129, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
187
See, e.g., Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., (1915), 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d
Cir. 1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) I
61,961 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (denying International Trade Commission leave to inspect or copy
documents involved in private antitrust suit on grounds that Commission had appropriate
discovery powers of its own); see also United States v. ARA Servs., Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 62,250 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (rejecting government's motion to discover documents produced by ARA Services in a related private civil antitrust action against ARA).
188 An area of particular concern to some is the problem of waiver of fifth amendment
privileges by corporate employees who testify under a protective order. The government
could not, of course, force them to testify. At the same time, however, corporate parties have
no fifth amendment rights, see United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694. 699 (1944) (privilege
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proves too much. If the government actually has such awesome investigative powers that it really does not need to take advantage of the labors
of others, willing though they may be, the prospect that the government
may nevertheless subsequently obtain that information provides little
additional incentive for the opposing party to resist discovery in litigation number one. Thus, the primary concern that granting access may
encourage resistance to discovery seems unfounded. Ironically, Judge
Frankel's case illustrates the point. After failing to obtain a modifi
cation of the protective order, the government used, and the court
enforced, a Civil Investigative Demand to obtain the very same information.' 8 9 Thus, a special rule denying the government access is inefficient as well as unjustified.
To the contrary, some cases in which the government has sought
access to discovery materials obtained by others suggest that the parties
involved have resisted discovery very energetically with the goal of imposing costs on governmental agencies less capable of bearing litigation
expense. Probably the best example of such behavior involves American
Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) which defended simultaneously a private antitrust action brought by MCI Communications and a
governmental proceeding. In the private litigation, MCI had, at great
expense, winnowed approximately 2.5 million pertinent documents
from among some 12 million produced by AT&T.' 90 Rather than undertaking the same task, the government proposed to use MCI's effort
by obtaining a copy of its computerized analysis of AT&T documents.
Although MCI did not object, AT&T did and litigated the matter as far
against self-incrimination is personal and cannot be utilized "by or on behalf of" corporation), and both corporate and individual parties are subject to sanctions such as dismissal or
default for refusing to respond to discovery on fifth amendment grounds. The protective order
offers a way to avoid this dilemma in litigation between private parties, but it is ineffective if
the government can have the order modified. See generally Note, Modifation of Protective Orders:
Balancing PracticalConsiderations and Addressing ConstitutionalRights, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv.
1011 (1980) (courts should permit individual defendants to assert retroactively their privilege
against self-incrimination when government seeks access to protected depositions); cf Heidt,
The Conjurer's Circle-The F/ith Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1095-99
(1982) (protective orders generally limit circulation of incriminating statements only temporarily). The real difficulty that troubles these critics, it seems, is that in civil litigation the
fifth amendment right is limited to natural persons and, when invoked, can cause a court to
enter sanctions against the "innocent" corporate employer. Although the benefit of added
information that would otherwise be unavailable is a legitimate concern, this problem does
not merit critical weight in the decision whether to permit the government access to deposition testimony given under protective order. It is merely another consideration that a court
should weigh in deciding whether to grant modification.
189 See United States v. GAF Corp., 596 F.2d 10 (2d Cir 1979). The court found it "unlikely that private litigants will hold back discovery in what are already serious treble damage
suits merely because of an additional threat of a CID directed to an adversary for discovery
by the Antitrust Division." Id at 15.
190 See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1338-39, 1339 n.75 (D.D.C. 1978). In
United States v. GAF Corp., 596 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979), it was reported that the process of
analyzing Kodak's documents had cost GAF $2 million. Id at 17 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
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as the Supreme Court only to be denied certiorari.' 9 l In view of the
92
it
reported expense of AT&T's defense against the government's suit,
seems specious to argue that its efforts will be redoubled unless the government is unable to profit from MCI's discovery. Indeed, as the National Commission for the Review of the Antitrust Laws concluded:
"Potential defendants have no legitimate interest in wasting the government's time and taxpayers' money in the interest of gamesmanship...
except upon a judicial determination that it would be grossly unfair or
193
unjust to do otherwise."'
In sum, the cases that actually decide the question of nonparty access to protected discovery materials almost universally deny such access
94
unless intended to garner information for use in other litigation.
Even where the nonparty wants to use the information in litigation, the
courts are evolving rules that protect those who rely on protective orders. Although the ultimate outcome of this development is unclear, it
shows that the courts realistically assess the needs of the discovery system, rather than the theoretical advantages of public disclosure, in modifying protective orders.
2.

Discoveg, MaterialsInvolved in PretrialRulings

Although few cases actually go to trial, pretrial rulings in many
cases involve materials obtained through discovery, sometimes including
materials covered by a protective order. Maintaining the confidentiality
of such materials may be inappropriate after they are the subject of a
judicial ruling. Ordinarily, discovery materials subject to judicial ruling
would become part of the public record. If the discovery materials are
filed under seal, however, the public may not have access to them. As
the Supreme Court recently stated: "The operations of the courts and
191 AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
192 Even before the trial began, AT&T reportedly had spent $250 million defending the
antitrust action brought by the government. See Long Lines Drawn as CurtainRings Up, Nat'l
LJ., Feb. 2, 1981, at 13, col. 1.
t93 Report of the National Commissionfor the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, 80 F.R.D.
509, 551 (1979). For a more general argument favoring sharing of discovered information, see
Sherman & Kinnard, FederalCourt Discovery in the 80"s-Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245,
284-91 (1983). For arguments that federal agencies should be granted access to grand jury
materials to reduce their burden of gathering information, see Note, FederalAgency Access to
Grandjug TranscriptsUnder Rule 6(e), 80 MICH. L. REv. 1665 (1982); Note, FacilitatingAdministrativeAgeng Access to GrandJu Material, 91 YALE LJ. 1614 (1982). The courts appear to be
responding to such concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983)
(upholding grand jury subpoena for materials held under protective order).
194 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820
(1970); Times News Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1974); cf.
Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing newspaper access to sealed portion of trial transcript). For a discussion of those extraordinary cases that justify public access, see in/a Part III (c)(3).
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the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."' 195
To evaluate a judicial ruling, the public may need access to the sealed
materials on which it is based. Thus, there are rights independent of the
public interest in the substance of discovery materials themselves that
come into play when a judge enters an order based on them. The question is whether this interest warrants public access.
To some extent, every judicial decision is of interest to the public
because it is part of the mosaic ofjudicial resolution. As a test for access
to otherwise confidential materials, this perspective is obviously too
broad. Because a court is not obliged to hold pretrial hearings in open
court, 196 the public does not necessarily have access to the decisionmaking process. More significantly, granting the public access to all materials upon which orders are based could undermine very significant
interests. To take an extreme case, when a party moves to compel production of documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court may review the documents in camera to determine
whether the privilege applies. If after that review the court denies the
motion on the basis that the privilege applies, it would be difficult to
evaluate the judge's performance without seeing the documents. Indeed, to permit an appellate court to review the judge's performance,
the documents presumably must become part of the record.' 97 Granting the public access, however, would undermine the privilege. 98 Thus,
the public's interest is outweighed by other interests.
At the opposite extreme, final decisions on the merits of a case are
peculiarly imbued with public interest. Thus, when a court actually relies on certain documents as grounds for granting a motion for summary
judgment, as in Zenith, the documents attain such significance that public access is presumed.' 9 9 In the same vein, the Second Circuit recently
indicated that when a derivative action is dismissed on the basis of the
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
Cf FED. R. EvID. 612 (providing that when portion of document used by witness to
refresh recollection is withheld over objections after examination in camera, it "shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal"). In the same
vein, where a court reviews documents in camera to determine if they are covered by an
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), the reviewing court
must have access to the documents also. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974) ("An appellate court . . . must conduct its own
investigation into the document.").
198 See United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980), where the court denied
access to materials that were the subject of a motion to suppress on the ground that they were
illegally seized. The court noted that "it would be ironic indeed if one who contests the
lawfulness of a search and seizure were always required to acquiesce in a substantial invasion
of those interests simply to vindicate them." Id at 321 (footnote omitted); of. Crystal
Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1980) (court places briefs discussing privileged materials under seal).
199 See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 88 F.R.D. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (summary
judgment); of Lee Tec Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,942 (D.
195
196
197
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decision of a special litigation committee of the board of directors, the
public should have access to the materials relied on in making that
2
decision. 00
Between these two extremes it is more difficult to determine
whether public access is justified. Cases in which courts have denied
access to the documents used in deciding motions for preliminary injunctions 20 1 demonstrate that a determination on the merits is not the
dispositive factor. In Zenith, Judge Becker adopted an ad hoc balancing
test to determine which materials to disclose because of their impact on
the summary judgment proceedings. He held that the public interest
applied to all materials offered in evidence in good faith-even those
ruled inadmissible by the court-on the ground that the public has an
interest in evidentiary rulings, "especially in situations where, as here,
[the] evidentiary rulings are critical to the ultimate disposition of the
case."'20 2 He also found that the public had an interest in materials referred to in good faith during the hearing of the motion. After examining the interests against disclosure, 20 3 he granted access to all materials
prepared by the parties and submitted in connection with the summary
judgment motion, 20 4 but refused to allow disclosure of certain economic
data and discovery materials filed under seal.
Judge Becker's approach in Zenith is troubling. His emphasis on
the public interest in evidentiary rulings comes dangerously close to the
extreme example of a motion to compel disclosure of privileged materials suggested above. It is unclear whether the good faith limitation can
effectively limit efforts to inject confidential but irrelevant materials into
judicial proceedings. In the context of a successful motion for summary
judgment, however, an expansive view may be appropriate, particularly
where, as in Zenith, "evidentiary rulings are critical to the ultimate disposition of the case. '20 5 More generally, the dividing line is in the process of evolution. 20 6 Even with respect to motions for summary
Minn. 1982) (court found public interest in documents on which punitive damages verdict
was based exceeded interests in confidentiality).
200 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
201 See Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1273, 1277-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597, 600-01
(D.NJ.), afd, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
202 529 F. Supp. at 899; accord United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 299 n. 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
203 See 529 F. Supp. at 901-05 (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
589 (1978)). For a discussion of Niixon v. Warner Communications, see supra notes 134-36 and
accompanying text. The showing needed to justify denying access to such materials would
have to be stronger than the showing needed to provide good cause for a protective order
because the public interest in materials involved in judicial decisions is much greater than the
corresponding interest in routine discovery materials.
204 529 F. Supp. at 905-08.
205
206

Id at 899.
Particularly difficult problems may arise in class actions because of a court's substan-
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judgment, however, there may be substantial reasons to deny access to
these materials when the court denies the motion. The requisite legal
determination for denial of a motion for summary judgment-the existence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact-provides little insight
into the decision on the merits. Rather, such a decision is properly characterized as a refusal to decide the merits. Given the frequency and ease
with which parties move for summary judgment, oftentimes as a pretext
for public dissemination of discovery materials, a good faith rule provides inadequate protection. Moreover, a ruling that a party must disclose to the public all materials offered in connection with a motion for
summary judgment that is ultimately denied could preclude later settlement conditioned on confidentiality.
Accordingly, the better course is to limit this ground for public access to materials forming the basis for the decision on the merits. The
critical point is that public access is justified by the special interest in
overseeing judicial action and not by the general public interest in the
discovery materials themselves. Regardless of the future contours of this
ground for access, the fact that some interest other than the mere production of materials through the discovery process serves as the justification for disclosure belies a generalized right of nonparties to obtain
access to the fruits of discovery.

tial duty to supervise these lawsuits. The Supreme Court has recently intimated that the first
amendment circumscribes a court's power to limit communications with class members. See
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). The Fifth Circuit's decision in the case, which
the Court affirmed, had treated these orders as prior restraints. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619
F.2d 459, 466-78 (5th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court did not, however, resolve the case on
constitutional grounds. See 452 U.S. at 101-02. Thus, there are first amendment limits on the
exercise of a court's power.
In exercising the power to supervise class actions, courts make decisions that implicate
public interests, thereby creating a basis for public access. Particularly difficult problems
may result from a court's duty under rule 23(e) to approve any settlement of a class action.
To do so, a court must conclude that the settlement is "fair, reasonable and adequate," In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 217 (5th Cir. 1981), a process that requires some assessment of the evidence unearthed by the parties. If that material is covered
by a protective order, the court's process of assessment may provide a basis for vacating the
order. Yet disclosure might preclude a settlement contingent on confidentiality. In addition,
the court must give the class members notice to allow them to decide whether to object to the
settlement; the class members are entitled to pursue discovery regarding the merits of the
settlement. Cf. City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464 (2d Cir. 1974) (limiting
discovery available to objecting class members in light of available data). In view of the
extent of disclosure and judicial evaluation of the merits, it is questionable whether class
actions can often be settled on a confidential basis. For an example of the difficulty of maintaining confidentiality in the class action settlement context, see Rodgers v. United States
Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976). In the CorrugatedContainer cases, the Fifth Circuit
eventually upheld the trial court's reliance on sealed materials in approving the class settlement on the ground that the publicly articulated findings gave sufficient notice of the basis
for the court's action. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1322, 1326-27
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1012 (1982).
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3. Public Interest in Governmental Acts
There are rare cases in which alleged governmental misconduct justifies access. Halkin was one such case. The court there observed that
the discovered information about CIA activities "lies near the heart of
. . .the first amendment. ' 20 7 In another recent protective order case,
the court described the governmental behavior as "one of the most controversial and well-publicized events in recent Puerto Rico history." 20 8
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recently upheld a trial court's order vacating
its longstanding protective order covering the discovery materials developed in civil actions arising from the shooting deaths of students during
the May 1970 demonstrations on the campus of Kent State University. 20 9 In these cases, it is the substance of the discovered information,
rather than its role in judicial decisionmaking, that is critical.
These cases prompt two significant observations. First, they are
very rare. The Supreme Court's right of access cases involving prison
conditions 210 demonstrate that the fact that information is sought about
governmental activity does not ensure automatic public access. Indeed,
in one case involving prison conditions the Court appeared to view a
protective order as a useful tool. 211 Even a case involving matters of
historical importance does not automatically merit publicity. For example, in deciding whether to enter a protective order covering a settlement agreement reached by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
in an action against certain accountants involved in the failure of Franklin National Bank, the court considered the "historical importance of
the FNB failure," but decided that avoiding a six-month trial nevertheless justified entry of a confidentiality order.2 1 2 When disclosure is appropriate, moreover, a court should strive to preserve confidences that

208

598 F.2d at 188.
In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 110-11 (Ist Cir. 1981).

209

Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 54 (1982). Another

207

recent example is McSurely v. McAdams, 502 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1980), in which former
antipoverty workers asserted that a United States Senator and various congressional officials
had violated their constitutional rights by allegedly arranging a raid on the plaintiffs' house
as part of a pattern of harassment. See Civil Damage Suit Won By M'Surleys, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,

1983, at 9, col. 1 (city ed.). Even in this case, the court entered a protective order. See MeSurely v. McAdams, 1982-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9158 (D.D.C. 1982); see also ACLU v.
Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1345 (5th Cir. 1981) (in suit alleging illegal surveillance by Mississippi
Sovereignty Commission, court held that although Mississippi Legislature could not seal files
of Commission against discovery to allow "old wounds to heal," court could issue an appropriate protective order to accommodate defendants' interests); United States v. Dorfman, 550
F. Supp. 877, 879 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (court granted public access to materials received in pretrial
suppression hearing, noting that charges included attempt to bribe United States Senator and
case involved "the most pervasive wiretap in the history of the federal wiretap statute").
210

See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.

See supra note 148.
212 See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sees. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aJ'dsub
nom. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
211
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need not be revealed. Thus, in the Kent State cases, the trial court kept
all discovery material sealed until the cases were settled in an attempt to
promote settlement. After settlement, the court ordered the redaction of
all material that would invade privacy before vacating its protective order3' 3 Even when governmental activity is involved, then, general public access to confidential materials will only rarely be appropriate. The
mere presence of the government as one of the litigants should not be
214
controlling in most cases.
Second, this public interest exception applies only to governmental
activity; it does not apply to purely private activity that has generated
great public interest. This conclusion follows from the observation in
Nixon v.Warner Communications that courts may deny access to matters in
the public record after trial in divorce cases and other cases involving
purely private interests.2 1 5 Problems are likely to arise, however, in situations in which private litigants are dealing with matters that involve a
substantial public interest. One commentator has argued, for example,
that there is a substantial public interest in the actions of large private
enterprises.2 1 6 Furthermore, it is easy in our highly regulated society to
hypothesize a governmental role, even if only by emphasizing government inaction. For example, the Seventh Circuit used the following hypothetical to justify its decision to overturn a local rule gagging attorneys: "[I]n an airplane crash case an attorney who discovered that
unsafe flight procedures were in effect and were being condoned by governmental regulatory agencies could not impart this vital knowledge to
the public .... "217 Part IV of this article addresses the difficult
problems presented by the rights of the litigants and their attorneys to
discuss the case. This Part addresses only the public's right of access.
213 Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 217 (6th Cir.),cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 54 (1982). For
examples of similar redaction of taped evidence before release to the press, see In re National
Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814,
829 (3d Cir. 1981).
214 Brief reflection on the number of mundane cases in which the government is a party
should suffice to demonstrate that, in most such cases, there is no significant public interest.
Consider, for example, all the simple tort claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Rarely
will a collision with a mail truck involve issues analogous to CIA surveillance of civilians.
Furthermore, other cases in which the government is a party might involve archetypal trade
secret information. Consider, for example, a suit by NASA alleging that a supplier had provided a defective part for the space shuttle where the design of the part became an important
issue. As in this example, the bulk of the lawsuits in which the government is a party involve
private disputes where one party merely happens to be the government. These suits hardly
invoke the public interest to the same degree as did Halkin.
215 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
216 See Note, Rule 2 6(c) Arotective Ordersand the First Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1645,
1656 (1980) (equating information about government with information about large private
corporations).
217 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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With respect to the public right of access, the hypothetical government
noninvolvement is insufficient to justify access in the airplane crash case
just as it is insufficient in a divorce case, although there may be an actual public interest in both.
In so concluding one must acknowledge that the public interest
may appear strong in some situations. Appropriately, an actual airplane
crash case provides a good example. In 1974, a DC-10 crashed near
Paris, killing all 350 persons on board. The crash spawned a multitude
of wrongful death lawsuits in this country, all of which were ultimately
consolidated before Judge Pierson Hall, who ordered all depositions
sealed. The publisher of the London Times sought a declaratory judgment establishing its right to send a reporter to the depositions. Noting
that depositions are not part of the trial, Judge Hall rejected The Times's
arguments and dismissed the action. 218 Meanwhile, the discovery process uncovered documents indicating that the manufacturer may have
known of the alleged design defect that caused the disaster before the
plane went into production. After this disclosure, the manufacturer
stipulated to liability on the condition that all discovery remain confidential and Judge Hall so ordered.2 19 Thus, the evidence relating to the
alleged design defect was never publicly examined or discussed.
The result is troubling from the perspective of other potential passengers on DC-10s. There has, after all, been another DC-10 disaster
since. 220 Should the judge have insisted on some change in design or a
warning to the airlines as a condition for continued confidentiality?
The answer ultimately depends on the assumption that lawsuits are
designed to resolve private claims, not to generate information for public consumption. Surely it would be odd to force the parties to proceed
with litigation by denying them the confidentiality they had agreed
upon as a condition for settlement. The information involved would not
have been revealed but for the initiative of the plaintiffs, and was provided to them only for use in connection with their litigation. Once that
objective was accomplished, the information should not become an impediment to resolving the case.
In sum, there are reasons for limiting the public interest notion to a
218 Times Newspapers Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal.
1974); accord In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that CBS does not have standing to challenge protective order to which parties did
not object). In the Agent Orange litigation, the court later decided, however, to allow disclosure of certain materials covered by the protective order. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 539 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
219 This description of the negotiation of stipulation to liability is based on a presentation
by Professor Andreas Lowenfeld of New York University Law School at the program of the
Civil Procedure Section of the American Association of Law Schools in Philadelphia, Pa., on
January 7, 1982. See 1982 Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Cassette No.
44B (1982).
220 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979,90 F.R.D. 613 (N.D.
Ill. 1981).

1983]

PROTECTIVE ORDERS

narrow group of cases involving governmental actions in which there is
a substantial public interest. Most cases do not, however, fall into this
category. Thus, general dissemination of discovered information is the
exception rather than the rule.
IV
REASSESSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF
LITIGANTS

The more difficult task of properly assessing the first amendment
rights of the litigants and lawyers remains. Unlike the public at large or
other parties involved in related litigation, these people receive information generated through discovery whether or not it is covered by a protective order. Here again, however, one confronts the myths underlying
the Halkin analysis. Beyond assuming that discovery information is a
part of a public process, Judge Bazelon predicated his analysis of the
rights of litigants on the conclusion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally contemplate free disclosure of discovered information.
Part I of this article demonstrated that lawyers and judges actually assume the contrary. This Part argues that Halkin's premise is also contrary to established precedent about the proper purposes of discovery.
Courts should reject this premise as well as the myth that discovery is
public and recognize that substantial restrictions on the dissemination of
confidential information obtained through discovery are warranted to
guard against undermining the civil discovery system.
A.

Proper Purposes for Discovery and Unfettered Use of
Discovered Information

Halkin assumes that the Federal Rules allow any use of discovered
information in the absence of a protective order. Pushed to its logical
conclusion, the Halkin approach establishes civil litigation as an alterna222
22
tive to the Freedom of Information Act ' for obtaining information.

What Justice Stewart maintains the Constitution does not do,2 23 Halkin
finds in the interstices of the Federal Rules.
It is astonishing in this era of litigation boom and discovery crisis to
suggest that information-gathering is a legitimate purpose for litigation.
The more sensible response is reflected in a number of pleading cases, in
which the courts have denied plaintiffs access to discovery even for the
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). In Halkin, for example, it appears that the materials at the heart
of the controversy could have been obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. See 598
F.2d at 207 n.30 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); f Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc.,
1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,179 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding antitrust claim alleging defendants brought lawsuit solely to generate publicity adverse to competitor).
223 See supra text accompanying note 171.
221
222
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purpose of developing evidence for use at trial unless they already have
sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that there is a good basis for the
suit. In applying rule 9(b)'s requirement of particularity in pleading of
fraud, for example, many courts reject plaintiffs' contentions that they
need discovery to provide the specifics. As the Second Circuit observed
in a leading case, "[a] complaint alleging fraud should be filed only after
a wrong is reasonably believed to have occurred; it should serve to seek
redress for a wrong, not to find one. ' 224 Courts have applied similar
reasoning in civil rights suits and other actions. 225 Although one may
criticize these decisions for denying plaintiffs the very tools the Federal
Rules provide to enable them to prove their claims, 226 they stand in
stark contrast to the cases suggesting that parties may initiate litigation
and discovery to obtain information-to find a wrong and report on itrather than to obtain judicial relief.
Not surprisingly, the freewheeling view of the discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules adopted in Halkin and similar cases has scant legal
support. The basic reasoning of these courts is that because the rules
provide for specific limitations on disclosure only upon a showing of
good cause, courts and the parties must assume that information obtained through discovery can otherwise be put to any use. 227 This view
is contrary to the assumption made by litigators and most trial courts
that discovery is inherently intended only for use in connection with the
224
Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1972); accord Lincoln Nat'l Bank v.
Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. Il1. 1976).
Most of these cases were suits under SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 2240.10b-5 (1983),
which is the general securities antifraud rule. The approach taken by these courts is arguably
inconsistent with Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), in which the
Court declined to impose the traditional common law fraud requirement of proof by clear
and convincing evidence in rule lOb-5 cases. It reasoned that "[t]he interests of defendants in
a securities case do not differ qualitatively from the interests of defendants sued for violations
of other federal statutes such as the antitrust or civil rights laws, for which proof by a preponderance of the evidence suffices." Id at 692. If a higher proof requirement is not appropriate,
a higher pleading standard also seems questionable.
225 See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1980);
Albany Welfare Rights Org. Day Care Center v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1973);see
also Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers,
542 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1976) (first amendment defense in antitrust action), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463
F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972) (antitrust suit).
226 These decisions are subject to criticism on the ground that they overreact to problems
with the abuse of discovery in particular and abuse of litigation in general. The central
difficulty in many of these decisions is that even though discovery appears to be the only way
in which the plaintiffs can substantiate their charges, it is denied to them. The point is not
that these cases are right, but that it is illogical to promote litigation principally designed to
obtain information and, simultaneously, to deny discovery principally designed to prove the
plaintiff's case.
227 See, e.g., Halkin, 598 F.2d at 188; AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978),
cer.
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); 4J. MooRE &J. LuCAS, SuPra note 156, 26.75, at n.3 (2d
ed. Supp. 1982-83) (citing Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
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litigation. 2 28 It also renders the risk of public disclosure irrelevant to the
decision whether to order production. 229 The existence of a good cause
requirement for entry of an affirmative protective order does not, by
reverse reasoning, justify rejecting the existing expectations of litigants
and courts. In fact, cases discussing the proper purposes for discovery
directly contradict this argument.
In addition to relying on the absence of specific limitations on the
use of discovery materials, the Hkin majority, like several other
courts, 230 relied on a 1955 district court decision 231 for the proposition
that a party who obtains information through discovery can "use that
information in any way which the law permits." 232 In reality, the 1955
ruling is much more narrow and actually suggests a contrary conclusion.
The defendants there were being sued, or feared a second suit, on matters they perceived to be related to the issues in the present litigation.
They contended, therefore, that a protective order was necessary to prevent the plaintifFs counsel from turning discovered information over to
the defendants' other adversaries. 233 In response, the plaintiff's attorney
submitted an affidavit disavowing any intention of divulging information obtained through discovery to the other attorneys. In addition, he
asserted that "with respect to general information that comes to him
here and is relevant to another action he should be able to use that
information in any way which the law permits. ' 234 The court, finding
that the defendants' motion was based on "an imputation of bad faith
to plaintiff or its counsel," denied the motion due to "the absence of
anything to make me doubt the attorney's good faith. ' 235 When viewed
in its proper context, therefore, this case hardly stands for the broad
proposition for which Halkin and others have cited it. Indeed, the re228 See Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 98 Wash. 2d 226, 235, 654 P.2d 673, 679 (1982), cert.
granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct.'4, 1983) (No. 82-1721).
Nowhere in the history of the rules or in the commentaries which we
have read upon them can we find any indication that the purposes included
that of disseminating to the general public the information derived from discovery, or any suggestion that such dissemination would serve the ends sought
to be achieved by the rule.
229 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases suggesting that
the risk of disclosure is relevant.
230 Set, e.g., National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 423 (6th
Cir. 1981); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 46 Or. App. 795, 799, 613 P.2d 104, 106 (1980); Rhinehart v.
Seattle Times, 98 Wash, 2d 226, 264, 654 P.2d 673, 694 (1982) (Utter, J., dissenting) cert.
granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1721).
231 Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
232 Halkin, 598 F.2d at 188 (quoting Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 18 F.R.D.
503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
233
18 F.R.D. at 508.
234

Id

235

Id

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

peated emphasis of a good faith intention not to use discovered information for collateral purposes undermines Halkin's reasoning.
Contrary to Halkin's assumption, courts often assert that using discovery for any purpose other than preparation for trial in the action in
which the discovery is sought is bad faith that justifies denial of discovery. The issue usually arises in a situation in which the party seeking
discovery actually intends to use the information in another litigation.
As the Supreme Court observed in a recent case, "when the purpose of a
discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other
than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied. ' 236 The rationale
behind this rule is that if there is a ground for denial of disclosure in the
other proceeding, it would be subverted if disclosure of the same information could be compelled in the first proceeding. Courts reason, for
example, that it is improper to use civil discovery to obtain material that
cannot be obtained in a criminal proceeding. 23 7 Cases limiting discovery where the collateral purpose is not to use information in ancillary
litigation are rarer but not unknown. 238 For example, in Ga/ella v. OnasZsi
239 the celebrated false arrest action by photograher Ron Galella
against Jacqueline Onassis, the court excluded Galella from Onassis's
deposition to prevent him from photographing her during the deposition. 24° Thus, the courts are also sensitive to misuse of the discovery
system when, as in Galella's case, a party uses it to produce grist for the
media's mill. 24' Obviously, the point is not to encourage scrutiny of the
purpose of the party seeking discovery, 242 but the fact that it has any
236 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 n.17 (1978); accord Wilk v.
American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
237
See Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955
(1963); cf. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683-84 (1958) (dictum)
(improper to use grand jury to obtain information for use in civil proceedings).
238 There are also cases in which the forbidden purpose is used in ancillary civil litigation. See, e.g., Beard v. New York Cent. Ry., 20 F.R.D. 607, 610 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
239 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
240 Id at 997; see also Air Tec Assoc., Inc. v. Cottman Transmission Systems, 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,560 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (protective order limiting disclosure of commercial information because of fear that plaintiff would use information to harm defendant's
relations with other franchisees); Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers,
Inc., 54 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (photographs taken during discovery proceedings not to
be used for any purpose); cf.Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940,
944-46 (2d Cir. 1983) (court has no inherent power to restrict litigant's use of information not
obtained through discovery).
241 The trial court also granted Onassis relief on her counterclaims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 353 F. Supp. 196, 231, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Galella claimed
that his photographic activities were newsgathering and therefore immune from potential tort
liability because they were protected activity under the first amendment. The Second Circuit
rejected this argument. See 487 F.2d at 995-96; see also supra note 90 (quoting Soto v. Romero
Barcelo, 559 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.P.R. 1983).
242 It takes little imagination to envision the potential for collateral litigation if courts
regularly scrutinize the "true" purpose for discovery. Thus, while recognizing that a bad
purpose is potentially relevant, courts normally impose on the party making such an assertion
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significance undercuts Halkin's conclusion.
If the Federal Rules contemplated free use of discovered information for collateral purposes, the intention to make such use of relevant
information would not justify denying discovery. Thus, Halkin's assumption that the Federal Rules intended free dissemination of such
information cannot be reconciled with the above cases. The policy reasons that justify denial of discovery apply equally to limiting dissemination of information after it is produced through discovery. Any other
rule would deter cooperation and needlessly increase the intrusiveness of
discovery. Moreover, free dissemination threatens to subvert other values in the same way that using discovery for collateral purposes does. As
in Galella v. Onassis, free dissemination can cause an invasion of privacy
that is unnecessary to the litigation process, and it may threaten the
integrity of the litigation process itself.24 3 Balanced against these interests, the speculative possibility that in some cases the public would benefit from dissemination of information garnered through discovery hardly
warrants the conversion of the process into an investigatory tool for inquisitive litigants. Rather, courts should continue to affirm the widely
accepted premise of confidentiality.
Although information obtained through discovery is intended
solely for use in the related litigation, disclosure of such information
outside the litigation process is not contempt of court. To justify entry
of a protective order, one must show good cause. One court has held
that a counsel's statement that she intended to reveal information obtained through discovery to other plaintiffs constituted good cause justifying entry of a protective order,244 but such a conclusion is not essential
to undermine the Halkin premise. The point is that the assumption of
free discloseability does not follow from the absence of explicit limitations on disclosure. This assumption therefore should not be used to
limit the court's power to enter a protective order on a proper showing.

the duty to show that discovery is sought solely for that purpose. See, e.g., Johnson Foils, Inc.
v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales
Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Particularly in view of the assumption that the use of
discovery information for collateral purposes is improper, such limitations on inquiry into
purpose were well-founded. If the prevailing view changes and the parties are permitted to
use discovery information for any purpose, the courts may well be tempted to scrutinize purposes more closely before allowing discovery. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
243
See Konrad v. DeLong, 57 F.R.D. 123 (N.D. Il. 1972), where the court granted a
protective order to guard against intimidation of a witness by the defendant. The defendant
in this medical malpractice action had used discovery to obtain the report of the plaintiff's
medical expert and promptly forwarded it to the local medical association, asking that the
expert be investigated for unethical behavior. The court ordered the defendant to withdraw
the charges on the ground that they were made to intimidate the plaintiff's expert. Id at 125.
244 See Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 1972 Trade Gas. (CCH) 73,865 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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Reconciling the First Amendment with Rule 1 Interests

Rejecting the myth that the Federal Rules look with equanimity on
nonlitigation use of discovered information does not solve the problems
presented by litigants' first amendment rights. These problems are less
troubling, however, once that myth is rejected and other realities of the
judicial system are recognized. Initially, it is important to note that the
trial process is highly regimented. Indeed, the Supreme Court observed
recently that "[i]n the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary
to restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and jurors. '245 Courts may instruct attorneys and witnesses not
to mention or suggest the existence of inadmissible but highly interesting information. 246 The court instructs the jurors, who share only the
common bond of experiencing the trial, not to discuss the case with each
other, or anybody else, until it is completed and they begin their deliberations. Protective orders are also a part of this scheme, representing an
attempt to preserve the litigation process by limiting the freedom of parties and lawyers to reveal information they have obtained through the
judicial process.
The impact of these restrictions on litigants' first amendment rights
should not be taken lightly; no one would argue that they should be
imposed automatically. The direct prohibition on discussing confidential material is an obvious restraint of free expression. Less obvious is
the chilling effect resulting from a prQtective order. For example, a
party who discusses his case using
nonconfidential material may nevertheless face accusations that he
24 7
based his comments on information protected by the court's order.
The chilling effect can loom quite large to a party subject to a contempt
order. Thus, this article does not suggest that courts automatically impose protective orders on unwilling litigants.
Nevertheless, litigants have a substantial interest in the orderly operation of the civil litigation system that can properly be accorded substantial weight in evaluating first amendment rights. Balanced against
the interest in orderly litigation, most litigants' first amendment interests in free expression do not appear compelling. Because some cases
involve highly significant first amendment interests, however, it is impossible to urge that courts should disregard first amendment interests
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 n.21 (1981).
Thus, courts regularly instruct attorneys, parties, and witnesses not to refer to matters
that might be unduly inflammatory or prejudicial. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
247
Conversely, discovery can free a party from the chilling effect of potential defamation
claims because statements about the contents of court records may be absolutely privileged
against defamation claims under state law. At least one court has entered a protective order
prohibiting the plaintiff from revealing his own interrogatory answers to deprive him of that
protection. See Lucido v. Cravath, Swain & Moore, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1050
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
245
246
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altogether. The better solution is to adopt a waiver theory under which
a party is deemed to waive his first amendment rights when, after a
proper showing of confidentiality, a party chooses to extract information
from his opponent subject to a protective order.
1. The Weight Accorded Interests in Confidentiality
Even the Halkin court acknowledged that "[a] smoothly operating
system of liberal discovery is in the interests of litigants and society as a
whole, for it contributes to a full and fair airing of all material facts in
controversy. '248 Nevertheless, few courts have attempted to determine
how much weight should attach to these efficiency concerns as compared with the weight attached to the free expression interests protected
by the first amendment. Instead, in most cases, the right to a fair trial is
the interest advanced to counterbalance first amendment interests. In
criminal cases, the courts often find this interest compelling.2 49 Even in
criminal cases, however, the interest in free expression weighs equally
heavily in some circumstances. 250 At first glance, the interest in the
smooth operation of discovery in civil litigation hardly seems of comparable importance. Closer examination, however, shows that courts have
countenanced significant limitations on expression to protect interests
similar to those that motivate the entry of protective orders.
Limiting free expression to preserve the smooth operation of the
judicial system does not necessarily violate the first amendment. For
example, rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
25
grand jurors from disclosing matters occurring before the grand jury. '
It is uncontroverted that information of substantial public interest is
often revealed in such proceedings, and that the grand jurors have a first
amendment interest in revealing this information to the waiting media
or public. In every case, however, grand jurors are forbidden to disclose
this information even though no party has demonstrated any particular
reasons for secrecy in the given case.2 52 This restraint resembles a gag
order and certainly is more extensive than a protective order based on a
598 F.2d at 192.
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-52 (1966).
250 Thus, in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568-69 (1976), the Court acknowledged that there was a risk of impairing a fair trial. Nonetheless, the Court invalidated
a gag order entered by the trial court in a criminal case on first amendment grounds.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
251
252 For a dramatic illustration of a grand jury chafing at the restraints of secrecy, consider In re Grand Jury Impaneled January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970). The grand
jury there attempted to return an indictment, but the Attorney General directed the United
States Attorney not to sign it. As this contretemps developed, the New York Tnes published
an account, including a purported verbatim quotation from the grand jury's presentment. See
id at 683. The court held that an "indictment" without the signature of the United States
Attorney was ineffective to commence a prosecution, but in the public interest it decided to
disclose certain information about the grand jury's efforts. See id at 676-77, 679-80. With
respect to the New York Times article, the court held that it had the power to require The Tines
248
249
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particularized showing that applies only to certain information produced through discovery. Nevertheless, the restraint on grand jurors is
justified for several reasons: (1) it encourages prospective witnesses to
come forward with testimony; (2) it promotes truthful testimony; (3) it
avoids public ridicule of those not indicted; and (4) it protects against
flight by those who are indicted. 253 Despite these policy considerations,
courts sometimes grant interested parties access to grand jury materials.2 54 Even so, the restraint on the grand jurors' freedom to discuss
evidence presented before them is automatic, and the Supreme Court
has regularly confirmed the propriety of this tradition of pri
255
vacy.
The interests furthered by protective orders, and the risks of curtailing their reliability or availability, resemble the systemic interests
served by rule 6(e). Protective orders encourage full disclosure and attempt to prevent any unnecessary injury to parties and nonparties resulting from disclosure. In addition, the ready availability of protective
orders avoids a glut of protective order litigation that might otherwise
to divulge its sources. The court, however, declined to require disclosure because there was no
claim that any grand juror or court personnel had made forbidden disclosures. Id at 685.
Another example of grand jury activism is In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence
Before October, 1959, Grand Jury, 184 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960). In its report, the grand
jury indicated the nature of its proceedings and recommended that the court turn over evidence it had acquired to the Mayor of Richmond. Finding that the request "despite its
sincerity has no standing in law," id at 39, the court criticized the grand jury for disclosing
even the tenor of the evidence and ordered its report expunged. Id at 40.
The point in these cases is that grand jurors, even when acting with the best of motives,
have no right to disclose what they have learned. Only the court may decide what may be
disclosed.
253 See Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1356, 1361 (1983) (emphasizing "General Rule of Secrecy" of grand jury proceedings); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,
441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398
(1959); cf. Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1939) (court in rejecting
first amendment argument against oath of secrecy required of grand jury witness, described
witness's objection as "specious" and noted that "[i]t has never been supposed that grand
jurors are deprived of the constitutional right of free speech through the oath of secrecy which
they take").
254
Even though interested parties may have access, the court may limit any subsequent
disclosure of the grand jury materials. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441
U.S. 211, 223 (1979) ("[I]f disclosure is ordered, the court may include protective limitations
on the use of the disclosed material.').
255 Thus, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972), the Court, while holding that
a newspaper reporter has no first amendment right to refuse to answer questions before a
grand jury, noted in passing that "the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session,
and the meetings of private organizations." In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the
Court relied by analogy on the Branzburg quotation in concluding that the press has no constitutional right of access to prisons. Id at 833-34. The proponents of greater public access to
prisons rejected the analogy to prisons but did not reject the premise that grand jury proceedings are closed. Certainly none of the Justices are endorsing press access to their own conferences. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 356 (1979) (describing address
by Justice Brennan to new law clerks regarding maintaining confidentiality of Court's work).
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inundate courts in many more complex cases. Similar considerations
explain the automatic restrictions on disclosure by participants in other
semi-judicial proceedings. 256 In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,257 for example, the Supreme Court carefully reserved decision on
the constitutionality of disclosure restrictions while holding that the
state could not prosecute a newspaper for publishing information about
proceedings before a state judicial disciplinary commission. The commission was a public body established to consider disciplinary measures
against judges, and the state had provided that its proceedings should be
kept confidential. 258 The state maintained that keeping the proceedings
confidential encouraged the filing of complaints and the willing participation of witnesses, protected judges from the publicity of unjustified
complaints, and made resignation to avoid disciplinary proceedings a
viable method of resolving potential disputes. 259 The Court assumed
that these were legitimate state interests26° and did not question the
state's power to keep the proceedings confidential or to punish participants, including witnesses, 26 1 for disclosure. Thus, even though the deliberations of a public body regarding judicial performance were at
issue, the Court was careful to preserve the state's power to impose a
confidentiality requirement on the participants, including witnesses, and
26 2
to use contempt sanctions to enforce such limitations.
Landmark Communications indicates that courts should not lightly disregard potential disruption of orderly quasi-judicial proceedings in favor
256 For example, federal bankruptcy judges may exercise their discretion and restrict dissemination of information about examinations conducted pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 205.
See BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY FORMS, reprintedin 411 U.S. 989, 1025
(1973); see, e.g., In re Frigitemp Corp., 15 Bankr. 263, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). In a more
administrative context, state bar disciplinary proceedings are ordinarily confidential, and
comment about them is forbidden. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, § 766 (Supp. 1976);
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(10) (McKinney 1983); RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA 8 (codified following CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6087 (West 1974)).
257 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
258 Forty-nine states had established similar commissions and all of them provided that
their proceedings be confidential. See id at 846-48 app., for a listing of all such rules. The
Court apparently was concerned about nullifying this widespread practice. The practice of
confidentiality may, however, be changing. See How ShouldJudges Be Disciplined?, Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 31, 1983, at 1, col. 4 (stating that 19 states now make public the proceedings of these
commissions). Even where efforts are made to keep such proceedings secret, it may be impossible. See UnfitJustice?, 69 A.B.A. J. 885 (1983) (noting leaking of sealed records concerning
investigation of Justice of Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
259 See 435 U.S. at 835-36.
260 See id at 841.
261
See id at 837 n.10.
262 See Note, Public DisclosuresofJugy Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REv. 886, 903-04 (1983)
(suggesting that restrictions on discussion about cases by petit juries would be upheld); Comment, FirstAmendment StandardsforSubsequent Punishment of Disseminationof ConfidentialGovernment
Information, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 84-85 (1980) (arguing that prior restraints against release
of information on governmental hearings generally will be upheld under Landmark
Communications).
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of first amendment interests. 2 63 Discovery proceedings are no more formal than proceedings before a grand jury or a commission on judicial
performance. Surely a civil litigant, particularly a plaintiff, has more to
gain by preserving the orderly functioning of the civil discovery system
than a grand juror or witness before the judicial competence commission
has to gain by the orderly functioning of those bodies. In terms of the
weight accorded rule 1 interests and the benefits accruing to the party
whose free expression is inhibited, orderly discovery is therefore entitled
to significant weight even against first amendment interests.
The privacy rights of persons compelled by judicial process to reveal private information further counterbalance the litigants' first
amendment rights. Since Griswold v. Connecticut 264 was decided in 1965,
courts and commentators have suggested that a constitutional right to
privacy may ensure the confidentiality of private information in some
circumstances. Indeed, Judge Bazelon himself asserted in a 1977 article
that "privacy can be a valuable right that should yield only to a more
important interest, and then no more than actually necessary. '26 5 Although this privacy right is usually advanced in cases involving sensitive
personal affairs such as familial relations, some lower courts have said
that it applies to protect financial information as well. 266 Commenta26 7
tors have even argued that it justifies keeping public records secret.
263 Such interests do not always justify restraints on first amendment rights. Thus, in In
re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982), the court invalidated a district
court local rule forbidding questioning of jurors on the ground that it was not "narrowly
tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the administration of justice."
264 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425
(1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Miofsky v. Superior Court, 703 F.2d 332 (9th
Cir. 1983) (suit to enjoin disclosure of information in state court on ground that such disclosure would violate plaintiff's federal right to privacy).
265 Bazelon, ProbingPrivacy, 12 GONZ. L. REv. 587, 600 (1977). In Moskowitz v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1982), the court adopted essentially the same
theory in issuing a protective order covering financial information:
The constitutional right of privacy is not absolute; it may be abridged to accommodate a compelling public interest. One such interest, evidenced by
California's broad discovery statutes, is "the historically important state interest of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings." . . . Even where the balance weighs in favor of disclosure of private
information, the scope of the disclosure will be narrowly circumscribed; such
an invasion of the right of privacy "must be drawn with narrow specificity"
and is permitted only to the extent necessary for a fair resolution of the
lawsuit.
Id at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (quoting Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 856-57, 574
P.2d 766, 773-74, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 702-03 (1978)) (citations omitted).
266 See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1129 (1979); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1970); cf Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1975) (privacy rights under California Constitution).
267
See, e.g., Note, Sealed Adoption Records and the ConstitutionalRight of Privacy of/the Natural
Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 451 (1982); Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Withhold Private
Information, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 536 (1982); Case Comment, A ConstitutionalRightto AvoidDisc/a-
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That rule 26(c) protective orders are intended to protect such privacy
interests can be proved by further reference to Halkin. The Halkin plaintiffs, after defeating the defendants' protective order, filed certain materials they had obtained through discovery in opposition to the
defendants' motions for summary judgment. Before filing the materials,
however, they obtained a protective order sealing some of those filings to
protect their own privacy. 2 68 Thus, although the extent of this emerging
constitutional privacy interest remains unclear, particularly in cases involving noncommercial information, it does provide additional support
for the application of protective orders despite the first amendment
rights of litigants.
2.

The FirstAmendment Interests of Litigants

The reality of civil litigation is that it ordinarily serves to resolve
private disputes. Consistent with that private purpose, the litigants may
use the court's power to extract information from their opponents and
bystanders. Also consistent with the private nature of these disputes,
there is normally little first amendment interest in further dissemination
of the information thus obtained. Accordingly, the first amendment interests of litigants tend to be insignificant.
The most likely interest of the litigant would be to influence the
outcome of litigation by disclosing information obtained through discovery, but that desire merits no weight. As the Supreme Court observed forty years ago, "trials are not like elections, to be won through
the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper. ' 26 9 Thus,
under federal law it is a crime to picket or parade near a federal court in
order to influence either a judge or a jury.270 The Supreme Court has
upheld a state statute modeled on the federal statute against a first
amendment challenge because "[t]here can be no question that a State
has a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressure ofPersonalMatter: PerfectingPrivacy Analysis in J.P. v. De Santi, 71 GEo. LJ.219 (1982).
Many jurisdictions recognize that privacy interests alone may justify limiting common law
access to records of divorce proceedings. See Note, All Courts Shall Be Open.- The Pub/ic's Right to
VewJudicial Proceedings and Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 331, 332-33 (1979); see also supra 134-36
and accompanying text (discussing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
598 (1978)).
268 See Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 982 n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In their motion seeking
a protective order, the plaintiffs stated:
[I]t is now necessary for plaintiffs to file these documents as part of the record
in order to substantiate their averment [that the CIA gathered information
about them]. Since much of the information in these documents is not publicly available, plaintiffs seek the Court's permission to file the documents
under seal in order to minimize any further invasion of plaintiffs' privacy.
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Certain Documents Under Seal at 1-2, Halkin v. Helms,
No. 75-1773 (D.D.C. 1980) (copy on file at Cornell Law Review).
269
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
270 See 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (1976).
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sures which picketing near a courthouse might create. 2 7 1 Other expression designed to affect the result of the litigation is not criminal, but
there certainly is little first amendment interest in promoting a trial in
the newspapers.
Aside from influencing the result, however, the normal litigant's interest in the disclosure of confidential information obtained through discovery hardly implicates substantial first amendment concerns.
Consider information designated a trade secret. In a recent case the
plaintiffs vice president sought to market the defendant's secret
2 72
processes through seminars offered for a fee to others in the industry.
The information had not only been revealed through discovery, but also
disclosed in open court during the trial. The public disclosure at trial
led the court to hold that the vice president's entrepreneurial efforts did
not constitute contempt despite the protective order covering the information.2 73 The interest in such entrepreneurial expression, however,
differs materially from that existing in Halkin, where the information
was "near the heart of the information protected by the First Amendment. ' 2 74 Although the commentators have reached no consensus
about the first amendment interests in commercial speech,2 75 it seems
271 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965). The statute was LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.401 (West 1974), which the Court noted was "modeled after a bill pertaining to the
federal judiciary. . . 18 U.S.C. § 1507." 379 U.S. at 561. Compare United States v. Grace,
103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983), in which the Court invalidated the application of 40 U.S.C. § 13k
(1976), which prohibits all demonstrations on the property of the Supreme Court Building, to
picketing on the sidewalk unrelated to pending cases. The Court acknowledged the importance of protecting against efforts to pressure the Court by public demonstrations, but held
that the statute did not sufficiently serve those purposes. 103 S. Ct. at 1710. In a separate
opinion, Justice Marshall argued that § 13k was unconstitutional on its face:
In contrast to 18 U.S.C. § 1507 and the statute upheld in Cox v. Louisiana,
§ 13k is not limited to expressive activities that are intended to interfere with,
obstruct, or impede the administration of justice. In Cox the Court stressed
that a prohibition of expression "unrelated to any judicial proceeding" would
raise "entirely different considerations."
103 S. Ct. at 1711-12 (citations omitted).
272 See National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418 (6th Cir.
1981).
273 See id at 423-24.
274 Halkin, 598 F.2d at 188.
275 Certain "commercial" speech is afforded less first amendment protection than other
forms of speech. Nonetheless, many viewed Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), as a seminal case ushering in an era of full
protection for commercial speech. Since then, however, other decisions have raised doubts
about this conclusion. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) ("We have not discarded the 'common-sense' distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech."). The result is that commentators
remain uncertain about the exact contours of existing law. See Note, ConstitutionalProtection of
Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720 (1982); Comment, First Anmendnent Protectionfor
Commercial Speech: An OpticalIllusion?, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 799 (1979.
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clear that the first amendment serves at most a limited function in fos276
tering the dissemination of trade secrets.
Analyzing protective order issues as they relate to litigants who do
have special first amendment interests may shed some additional light
on the overall influence of the first amendment on dissemination of discovery materials. A first category involving heightened first amendment
considerations is litigation involving the press as a litigant. Although
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the press has no greater
right than the public at large to obtain information, 277 restrictions on
the press are particularly offensive to first amendment values. The
courts have recognized the special status of the press in protective order
disputes. For example, in an action for libel and violation of the securities laws against the financial newspaper Barron's, it refused to agree to
"the customary pre-trial stipulation and order of confidentiality. '"278
The court held that although the plaintiffs showing might have warranted in camera inspection of the documents in the usual case, the first
amendment precluded a protective order against Barron's because any
attempt by the court to determine whether a publication was based on
material developed through discovery or independent investigation
would itself chill the newspaper's freedom to publish.2 7 9 Even against
the press, however, rule 1 interests may sometimes prevail. For example,
in a defamation action brought by the president of Mobil Oil Company
against the Washington Post, The Post sought to compel production of
documents held by Mobil. 280 To facilitate that process, the court entered an umbrella protective order despite The Post's objections. The
court rejected The Post's argument that Mobil should have to make a
particularized showing on each allegedly confidential document at the
time of production because that would unduly delay production and
28
involve the court too deeply in the discovery stage. '
276 Cf Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). In Connick, the Court upheld the firing
of a public employee for circulating a questionnaire among coworkers about the performance
of their superior. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the first amendment protected
her from disciplinary action for circulating the questionnaire because the employee spoke
"not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest." Id at 1690. To a limited extent, then, the Court has recognized
that there are differing interests in the dissemination of private information.
277 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683-84 (1972). The issue is, therefore,
different from the ongoing debate on special first amendment protection for the press's right
to gather information. See, e.g., Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731
(1977); Blanchard, The InstitutionalPress and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. CT. REv.
225; Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975). To the extent that
one rejects any special concern about limiting the free expression of the press, one lumps the
press together with other litigants in protective order disputes.
278 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
279 Id at 205; accord Georgia Gazette Pub. Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386

(1981) (based on Georgia Constitution).
280 See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24 (D.D.C. 1981).
281 Id at 29-30. The court reasoned that
[uinder the circumstances of this case, imposition of the protective order pro-
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A second discernable category of persons that have special first
amendment interests can be loosely labelled "public interest litigants."
The source for this category is a series of cases in which the Supreme
Court has indicated that litigation promoted by groups such as the
NAACP, 282 the ACLU,283 or unions28 4 may be a protected activity.
Consequently, the state has only a very limited power to regulate communications about such litigation by lawyers even though it admittedly
2 85
has a substantial general interest in regulating the practice of law.
Halkin invoked the "litigation as expression" concept to justify its narrow reading of the judicial power to enter protective orders.286 Although the analogy has some force, given the current litigation boom
Halkin's argument seems questionable and its implicit endorsement of
promotion of litigation unsettling. It is not unthinkable that public interest litigants will need to discuss material obtained through discovery
to promote their causes. If the state, despite its substantial interest in
regulating lawyers, may not prohibit activities by lawyers that have traditionally been regarded as harmful, such as champerty, it is difficult to
understand how limitations on expression by nonlawyers can be justified. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. Assuming
arguendo the existence of public interest litigants distinguished by their
devotion to a cause rather than to private gain hardly demonstrates,
however, that the first amendment interests of most litigants rise to a
comparable level. Moreover, even as to public interest litigants, protecposed by Mobil appears to be the only efficient way to handle the enormous
volume of material sought by The Post. . . . Absent an objection by The Post,
the Court will be freed of the time-consuming task of ruling on the numerous
claims of confidentiality likely to be raised by Mobil.
Id The court did, however, express "the hope that Mobil will use its best efforts and invoke
the terms of the protective order only when necessary to protect legitimate confidential matter." Id at 29 n.2. The court modified the protective order on June 21, 1983, to permit
disclosure of materials obtained from Mobil. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, No. 80-2387 (D.D.C.
June 21, 1983) (order modifying protective order), appeal docketed sub norn. Tavoulareas v.
Washington Post Co., No. 83-1688 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1983).
For another case in which the court restrained a newspaper from disclosing material
obtained from a defamation plaintiff through discovery, see Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 98
Wash. 2d 226, 654 P.2d 673 (1982),cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 821721). The court rejected the paper's argument that it was entitled to greater immunity from
protective orders because it was a newspaper. In National Enquirer, Inc. v. Superior Court,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983), the newspaper claimed that the trial court's protective
order forbidding it from publishing information gained during discovery from the plaintiff,
actress Shirley Jones, violated the first amendment. For a copy of the trial court's order, see
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. D, National Enquirer, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. 67772
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983).
282 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
283 See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
284 See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
285 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-62 (1978).
286 See 598 F.2d at 187.
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tive orders are not unknown in Supreme Court litigation. 28 7
Very few cases implicate the special first amendment concerns that

attend actions involving public interest litigants and the press. The reality, then, is that the interest most litigants have in discussing their litigations, and particularly in disclosing confidential information obtained
through discovery, is materially less compelling. One cannot argue,
however, that no other types of litigation involve first amendment interests. As suggested in the DC-10 situation discussed in Part III above, 288
discovery may reveal matters that are of legitimate interest to the community at large. In such situations, the first amendment interests of a
litigant may begin to resemble those of the public interest litigant or the
press regardless of the litigant's original intent concerning disclosure.
In some ways, the most troubling situation involves the retained
expert rather than the litigant. Retained experts are usually required to
sign affidavits acknowledging that they have read the protective order
and agree to be bound by it before they are given material covered by
the order.28 9 Nonetheless, receiving the protected material may place

them in a very difficult position. As one court observed in a pharmaceutical products liability case, "it might well result in a violation of medical ethics if a court were to require an expert acquainted with the
hazards or potential hazards of a drug to conceal that knowledge from
the public in general or particular patients. ' '2 9° The expert witness,
however, is not automatically entitled to act as a self-appointed savior.

For example, in one early case, the defendants' accountant examined
the plaintiffs books under a protective order. He then asserted that his

professional duty compelled him to reveal what he had discovered to his
other clients. Finding that such an assertion "carries within it the seed
287 See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). For a discussion of Kerr,
see supra note 148. The problem of class actions also merits discussion. In Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), the Court held that rule 23(d) would not uphold blanket
prohibitions on communications between counsel and the putative members of an uncertified
class and intimated that any effort to restrict communications between class members could
give rise to substantial first amendment problems. See id at 101-02. Somewhat ominously,
the court also cited Halkin. See id at 102 n.16. The extent of a court's power to limit such
communications is still ambiguous. At least one lower court has held that, Gui/Oil notwithstanding, it could forbid defense counsel from communicating with the unnamed members of
a certified class. See Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. III. 1982).
In the protective order context, the appropriate solution is to bind class members by protective orders just as with other litigants.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.
289 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. II, § 2.50, at 361 (5th ed. 1982). This
sample affidavit provides in part: "I understand that any use of information obtained by me
from material stamped 'Confidential' or any portions or summaries thereof, in any manner
contrary to the provisions of the Protective Order, will subject me to the summary sanctions
of this Court for Contempt."
290 In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 483-84 (E.D.
Mich. 1979), aftd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981).
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of abuse, ' 29 Judge Weinfeld rejected the professional duty justification
for disclosure. Judge Weinfeld's result seems justified. Every professional faces many inherent limitations on his free expression. Lawyers,
for example, may not disclose client confidences whether those confidences are of public interest or not. 292 Retained experts are in a similar
situation.
The litigants's first amendment interests must still be addressed.
These interests will not disappear through a simple process of categorizing cases as "private" or "public," particularly in view of the suggestion that certain kinds of commercial speech are entitled to full first
amendment protection. 293 Although the existence of a public interest in
discovery material does not compel disclosure,2 94 a litigant may, nonetheless, have a substantial interest in dissemination. Accordingly, to
state categorically that certain types of cases or litigants do not present
important first amendment concerns would be to propagate a new myth
about litigation. A litigant's first amendment interests, unlike the expert's professional interests, do not imply any duty to disclose. Thus, in
the DC-10 case, the plaintiffs could elect to surrender their right to disclose information as part of the settlement package. Surely first amendment interests are much less important when used as a mere bargaining
chip in the settlement process. Indeed, the fact that disclosure of discovered information is often only a bargaining chip suggests that waiver is
the solution to the first amendment problem for protective orders.
3.

Waiver

Although an individual can waive the first amendment right to free
expression, 295 such waivers are not easily found. Litigants do not waive
6
their right to discuss litigation or discovery merely by initiating it.29(
Accordingly, when, as in Halkin, production of information is not conditioned on confidentiality, the courts properly shun waiver as a solution
to the first amendment problem. Legitimate waiver arguments exist,
however, when a protective order is entered before disclosure.
Consent to the entry of a protective order should preclude a party
from subsequently disclosing the information. Even Halkin suggests that
291

Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 346, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see

also Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (upholding contempt finding
against expert who disclosed material under protective order to counsel who retained him to
assist in preparation of another litigation against same defendant).
292
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980).
293 See supra note 275.
294
See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
295 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (contractual waiver of right to publish sensitive material acquired during CIA employment).
296 See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006-07 (3d Cir. 1976); see
also Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1982) (commencement of lawsuit not waiver of right to privacy).
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a party in such a situation may lack standing to challenge the protective

order.29 7 Other courts have held such stipulations sufficient to warrant
a finding that the litigant has waived his first amendment rights. 298
This conclusion is inescapable even though these cases do not involve
judicial determinations of confidentiality. 299 A person may waive a constitutional right if he does so voluntarily and intelligently;300 there is no
requirement that he receive a quid pro quo for his waiver. Indeed, a
person can waive certain constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury
trial, by procedural oversight. 30 1 Negotiated protective orders appear to
be archetypal waivers. They are intelligent because they result from
consultations between client and lawyer and voluntary because the
party seeking discovery has no duty to consent to them. Moreover, the
protective orders do represent a quid pro quo. Protective orders save the
litigant seeking production of confidential information the time and
money that discovery disputes would entail and ensure that he will receive information that a court might otherwise decline to order produced. Hence, courts should hold that litigants who consent to a
protective order have waived their first amendment interest in future
disclosure.
The more difficult problem arises when the party refuses to stipulate to a protective order. Such refusal imposes on the parties and the
court the burden of preliminary litigation over the propriety of protection because such orders do not issue automatically. If the producing
party persuades the court to enter a protective order, however, the party

seeking discovery receives confidential information subject to restrictions
to which he has not voluntarily assented. Can courts find a waiver
See 598 F.2d at 190 n.27.
See, e.g., National Polymer Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 423 (6th
Cir. 1981) (waiver limited to pretrial disclosure); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (by agreeing to pretrial confidentiality
order, party waived right to obtain declassification of classified documents).
299 The ordinary order merely permits designation as confidential and does not involve a
finding of confidentiality. See supra note 45.
300 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that CIA may require person to waive his right to disclose information obtained during employment in return for
"privilege" of employment); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver must
be made with knowledge and intent). AlthoughJohnson v. Zerbst involved waiver of sixth
amendment rights, courts have applied the waiver formulation set forth therein to alleged
waivers of first amendment rights in connection with protective orders. See, e.g., National
Polymer Prods. Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1981); In re Halkin,
598 F.2d 176, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1007
n.14 (3d Cir. 1976). For criticism of the Court's handling of the waiver issue, see Meadow,
The FirstAmendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 81114 (1982).
301 See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Rule 38(b) requires a demand for jury trial within 10 days
after service of the last pleading directed to the issue. If no demand is made within the 10-day
period, the right is waived and the party must petition the court to use its discretion under
rule 39(b) to obtain a jury trial.
297
298
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under these circumstances? Again, a choice is presented-the party
seeking discovery may refuse to accept the terms of the order and decline production of the information subject to its terms. A quid pro quo
also exists in this case-if the party does go forward with discovery of
the confidential information, he obtains information that the court
probably would not otherwise have given to him. Thus, the party
should be bound by the limiting condition of the order that gave him
access to information he could not otherwise have obtained.
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it allows a court to condition discovery on the waiver of a constitutional right, thereby disinterring the late nineteenth-century notion that a government may
condition a "privilege" in any manner it chooses. 30 2 Indeed, Judge
Bazelon attacked the waiver argument on precisely that ground in
Halkin.30 3 For years commentators have inveighed against the rightprivilege distinction, 30 4 and the Supreme Court has announced its demise. 30 5 The prospect that protective order litigation may become enmeshed in this debate is extremely troubling. Although it is beyond the
scope of this article to enter that fray, a review of the debate suggests
that it should not undermine the waiver approach.
Despite protestations to the contrary, the concept that government
may exact a price for certain benefits refuses to die. As one commentator recently stated, the Court has evinced a "schizophrenic tendency
. . .to simultaneously disclaim the doctrine by name and resort to the
concept in practice .... -306 Others have persuasively shown that the
primary difficulty with the doctrine is that it merely states the problem
without offering a reasoned basis for deciding whether a given condition
302 The idea originated in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E.
517 (1892), in which a policeman discharged for political activity challenged his dismissal on
the ground that he had a constitutional right to engage in such activity. Speaking for the
Massachusetts court, Oliver Wendell Holmes disposed of this claim with an oft-cited aphorism: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." Id at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
Lest such a colorful characterization of the issue be thought dead, consider Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), where the Court rejected challenges to the procedures for
discharge of federal civil service employees. In his plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist explained that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant...
must take the bitter with the sweet." Id at 153-54. Although the majority rejected this articulation, the basic argument seems to have prevailed two years later in Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341 (1976).
303 See 598 F.2d at 190 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); accordIn re
San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 1981).
304 The best known attack is Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
305 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
306 Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Prvilege Distinctionin ConstitutionalLaw: The Priceof
Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69, 70 (1982).

1983]

PROTECTIVE ORDERS

should be held valid or invalid.30 7 Mere categorization does not suffice.
In 1976, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the provision of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971308 that required a candidate
who accepted federal campaign funding to surrender his right to spend
more than a specified amount on campaign advertising. 30 9 More significantly, in Snepp v. United Slates, 31 0 the Court essentially held that, in return for the "privilege" of employment by the CIA, the CIA may
require a person to waive his right to disclose information obtained during his employment.3 1' The Court justified its holding by emphasizing
the strong interest in secrecy in surveillance matters. 3 12 Thus, the validity of the restraint depends not upon categorization of the restraint as a
"condition" attached to a "privilege," but rather upon whether the in3 13
terest served by the restraint is sufficient to justify it.
Under this analysis, the right-privilege debate should not undermine the waiver approach proposed here. It is difficult to argue that
stipulated protective orders even fit the unconstitutional-condition
307 For a penetrating demonstration that the use of such labels serves to mask rather than
answer the question, see Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: ConditioningOne ConstitutionalRight on the
Forfeiture of Another, 66 IoWA L. REv. 741, 747-48 (1981).
308 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1982).
309 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95 (1976) ("[A]cceptance of public financing entails
voluntary acceptance of an expenditure ceiling."). Courts have employed similar reasoning
with respect to the privacy interests of those who enter public life. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455 (1977) ("Appellant concedes that when he entered
public life he voluntarily surrendered the privacy secured by law for those who elect not to
place themselves in the public spotlight."); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135-36 (5th
Cir. 1978) (by entering public life, plaintiffs relinquished some of their interest in financial
privacy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). Indeed, one commentator has observed that "I am
not sure there ir a 'doctrine' of unconstitutional conditions after Buckley v. Faleo." Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiagy Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981
SUP. CT. REv. 309, 348 (emphasis in original).
310 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
311 When he accepted his job with the CIA, Snepp signed an agreement requiring him to
obtain advance approval from the Agency before writing about his experiences or of information obtained during the course of employment. In enforcing that pledge, the Court emphasized the relationship of trust created under the agreement. See id at 510-13. In view of this
relationship of trust, the Court held that it was insignificant that the CIA had not alleged that
Snepp had, in fact, published classified material. See id at 511. The Court found that his
failure to submit his manuscript for pre-publication review alone justified imposition of a
constructive trust on his profits. Id at 512. The Court adopted the constructive trust remedy
in part because, being "swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those who would place sensitive
information at risk." Id at 515. Although it did not order prior judicial restraint, the Court's
ruling had the same practical effect. See also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th
Cir.) (upholding order enjoining publication of classified materials), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972). In a subsequent opinion after remand, the Fourth Circuit held that Marchetti, by
signing the secrecy agreement, "effectively relinquished his First Amendment rights." Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
312 444 U.S. at 511-13. The effect to be given to these interests, and their applicability on
the facts of Snepp, are hard questions that need not be addressed here. For a criticism of the
Court's handling of the waiver issue, see Meadow, supra note 300, at 811-14.
313 For an articulation of this approach to the problem, see Westen, supra note 307, at
747-52.
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model. The context is the judicial discovery apparatus, but it seems
more accurate to say that the government, through the courts, is enforcing the parties' agreement than to say that it is conditioning access to
discovery on waiver of first amendment rights. It is, after all, the party
producing the information who is conditioning the waiver of his right to
resist the discovery on the entry of the order. Thus, in some sense stipulated protective orders do not involve governmentally imposed conditions at all.
Where the parties have not agreed to a stipulation, the court is conditioning discovery on a restraint, but that does not mean that the condition is unjustified. From a procedural standpoint, the requirement
that the party seeking the protective order make a showing justifying
restraint, and the opportunity afforded the party potentially subject to
the protective order to oppose the motion, ensure a thorough and proper
airing of the question of whether the restraint is justified. The litigant
seeking discovery is certainly in a better position to contest the restraint
than the prospective CIA agent presented with a "take it or leave it"
employment package by his future employer. Thus, the procedural requirements ensure that a substantial justification exists for every order
entered. Furthermore, the rule 1 and privacy interests protected by the
entry of a protective order are entitled to considerable weight as against
first amendment interests, particularly the relatively weak interests of
most litigants. Indeed, with respect to the systemic interests underlying
rule 1, the restrained litigant himself has a stake in facilitating the orderly operation of the judicial system. Accordingly, even though a protective order entered after a contested hearing on the basis of a showing
of good cause may be categorized as a condition on a privilege, it is
justified and the litigant see~ing the confidential information is rightly
31 4
put to his choice.
Adopting the waiver approach does not suggest that courts must
automatically deny litigantsl the right to disseminate any information
obtained through discovery. To the contrary, the waiver approach obviates the risk that litigants Who have obtained information on the condition of secrecy may later plaim that they have an absolute right to
disseminate the information, despite that prior condition. The waiver
theory thus permits a court plresented with a motion for leave to disclose
material covered by the order to give proper consideration to rule 1 interests. The need for public-access to information having a substantial
31 5
public interest, such as the design information in the DC-10 situation,
314 Different considerations pertain where, as in Halkbn, the court enters the protective
order atyer production of the material. In that situation, the recipient has no opportunity to
make the choice upon which the waiver argument is based. Without a predisclosure opportunity to forego receipt of the material, iuch a party is subject to the chilling effects of a protective order, a consequence that raises pmore serious first amendment concerns.
315 See supra text accompanying hotes 218-20.
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or the medical expert who learns the hazards of a drug,31 6 is best determined by a court after consideration of the importance of the information to the public and the confidentiality interests of the party resisting
disclosure. A court then can evaluate the potential disruption that may
result from modifying the protective order in much the same way as
when a nonparty seeks access to discovery information for use in another
litigation.
CONCLUSION

This article proposes to avert rather than cause a revolution. Particularly in complex cases, the reality is that courts have used protective
orders flexibly to facilitate disclosure of information needed to prepare
for trial while protecting against extra-judicial use of such information.
The cases articulating a broad public right of access entirely disregard
this reality, however, and thereby threaten to undermine it. This article
has demonstrated that the premises underlying the public access approach are unsound and based largely on myth. The public does not
have access to discovery proceedings, or to their fruits, and recent decisions concerning public access to criminal trials supply no basis for concluding that the existing confidentiality of civil discovery violates the
first amendment or the common law right of access to trials. No legal
support exists for upsetting the reality to permit wider public dissemination of discovery materials. Rather, the courts should limit nonparty
access to materials subject to a protective order to those cases in which
one of the following special justifications is present: (1) the information
is needed as evidence in other litigation; (2) the information formed the
basis of a pretrial ruling on the merits and Access is necessary to permit
evaluation of that ruling; or (3) in extremely rare cases, the subject of
the litigation is alleged governmental misconduct, and there is a strong
public interest in access. Admittedly, the first two circumstances may
exist in many cases. When these circumstAnces arise, the court must
balance the desire for access against rule 1 interests to protect the judicial system in a way not possible when court§ treat the matter as a question of constitutional right based on the myth of public access.
Rejecting the myth of public access will remove many of the most
objectionable consequences of the first amendment analysis by eliminating the notion that information produced through discovery becomes
part of the public domain. Nonetheless, an expansive view of the first
amendment rights of the litigants, which permits a party who has received material subject to limitations to challenge a protective order
later on the ground that the order did not comply with Halkin's elabo316

See supra text accompanying notes 289-92.
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rate proof and findings procedure, will also undermine the reality and
render protective orders unreliable.
Hakin's overblown first amendment analysis derives partly from
the erroneous conclusion that the parties may use discovery material for
any purpose, absent a protective order, merely because the Federal
Rules do not specifically limit the dissemination. In reality, lawyers and
judges assume that the litigants should use the material obtained
through discovery only for preparation for litigation, even when the
court has not entered a protective order. Authority holding that a court
may deny discovery if the material is sought for some purpose other
than trial preparation confirms this assumption. Rebutting this myth
does not, however, solve the problem of the first amendment rights of
the parties. Although parties to civil litigation will rarely have substantial first amendment interests in disseminating information obtained
through discovery, some such cases do arise. To protect parties who rely
on protective orders, this article proposes that courts should employ a
broad waiver doctrine to eliminate the first amendment issue in any case
in which a party has stipulated to entry of a protective order or obtained
production of information subject to a court-imposed protective order
entered after a finding of good cause. This reasonable solution may,
unfortunately, become enmeshed in the morass of the right-privilege debate that has raged for years.
Efforts to improve the efficiency and speed of federal civil litigation
through amendments to the Federal Rides of Civil Procedure and increased case management by individual judges are likely to continue. It
would be ironic to undermine these efforts on the basis of newly discovered first amendment limitations on protective order practices. Recent Supreme Court decisions rejecting first amendment arguments for
access to information about governmental activities carried on behind
prison walls and authorizing the government to require job applicants
to waive their first amendment rights as the price for a governmental job
serve only to heighten the potential irony. Although one may legitimately question these restrictive attitudes toward free expression on a
variety of grounds, 3 17 situations in which first amendment interests have
317 For example, the government, seemingly emboldened by its success in Snepp, has expanded its reliance on such waivers. Thus, the New York Times reported that the government
will, in the future, require that a much larger number of federal employees sign Snepp-type
agreements. See SiffCurb Sought on Leaks of Data, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1983, at Al, col. 5;
President Orders Curbs in Handling of Classifed Data, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1983, at A1, col. 4.
Similarly, the Department of Defense asked reporters to sign a secrecy agreement that they
would not disclose the information provided at a briefing on Soviet military capabilities as a
condition for attending the briefing. See Reporters Balk at Secrecy Pledge, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15,
1982, at A17, col. 1. Although the "off the record" device has existed for decades, it is quite
ominous for the government to try to put such commitments in a legally enforceable form.
Such developments surely pose greater threats to first amendment interests than do protective
orders in civil litigation.
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been abrogated implicate interests far more significant than a private
litigant's interest in the dissemination of material obtained through discovery from another private litigant. Present protective order practice
very effectively furthers the rule 1 interests that motivated the recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 31 8 This practice is
worth preserving as one means by which to reduce the current unconscionable expense and delay in civil litigation. Only time will tell, however, whether myth or reality will prevail.
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See supra note 31.

